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Employee creativity has become the essential element for the survival and success 
of contemporary organizations under the fast-changing business environment. The 
increase in the importance of team systems in the flood of information has 
increased the attention to creativity in social relationship. 
This study combines social comparison theory (Festinger, 1954) and a dual-
pathway model of creativity (De Dreu, Baas, & Nijstad, 2008) to propose a 
framework that exhibits the process in which the social comparison of creative 
ability between team members influences individual creativity. In particular, this 
study focuses on the upward social comparison that individuals experience 
frequently in real team situations (Gerber, Wheeler, & Suls, 2018). I proposed the 
process model that upward social comparison influences individual creativity 
through emotional and cognitive responses.  
This study examined the emotional response to upward social comparison 
within teams based on two dimensions, namely, activation and valence, to answer 
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recent calls for the shift to the dimensional approach of emotions from multiple 
disciplines. Cognitive demotivation was also added to the cognitive flexibility and 
persistence, which are the two cognitively motivated states from the dual pathway 
model, in examining cognitive responses following emotions. This study also 
explored the processes that emotional and cognitive processes lead to three aspects 
of creativity, namely, radical creativity, incremental creativity, and creative 
disengagement. 
Using a multi-source multi-wave data, this study empirically validated that 
upward social comparison largely positively affects emotions and is related to 
radical and incremental creativity through cognitive flexibility. This research 
provides novel insights for researchers and practitioners by offering theoretical 
elaboration of the effects of social comparison processes on creativity and 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
“Creativity is contagious. Pass it on.” 
- Albert Einstein  
After four decades of research and theorization, the topic creativity has become more 
popular than ever (Zhou, Wang, Bavato, Tasselli, & Wu, 2019). In the contemporary 
dynamic business environment, employee creativity is crucial for the survival and 
prosperity of an organization. To understand creativity in contemporary organizations 
where competitions and cooperation are significantly increasing in intensity, studies on the 
social aspect of creativity have emerged (Perry–Smith & Shalley, 2003).  
Understanding the dynamics of individual members and their social environments is 
critical in improving productivity and effectiveness in group settings because the abilities 
and reactions of these members are greatly affected by their social environments (Nye & 
Brower, 1996; Levine, Resnick, & Higgins, 1993). As both task complexity and required 
expertise exceed the cognitive capability of individuals, contemporary organizations have 
begun to adopt team systems. Those organizations that crave for creative outcomes tend to 
assign all their capable human resources to the same team (e.g., R&D or task force teams 
for creative projects). All members of this team are compelled to cooperate or compete 
with one another. Under such conditions, these individuals compare their abilities, 
competencies, and performances with those of other members and then relate the 
comparison results to themselves. Therefore, understanding the social comparison process 
is key to gaining insights into the behaviors and performance of employees in 
contemporary organizations. In this respect, the effects of social cognitive process within 
teams on creativity must be investigated by using social comparison theory (Festinger, 
1954). 
In a process where social comparison affects creativity, emotion works as a mediating 
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mechanism to explain the relationship between these variables. Creativity can be achieved 
by using a broad array of cognitive categories and by gathering ideas from persistent hard 
work, whereas emotion helps promote or impede both paths to creativity (De Dreu, Baas, 
& Nijstad, 2008). To investigate the relationship between the social comparison process 
and creativity, I identify the role of emotion as a mediating mechanism.  
A recent meta-analysis has revealed that people tend to make upward comparisons 
with slightly better-performing individuals even if doing so may pose a psychological 
threat or bring forth negative emotions (J. P. Gerber, Wheeler, & Suls, 2018). Especially 
when abilities are concerned, classic social comparison theory posits that individuals tend 
to compare themselves with better people to improve their performance level (Festinger, 
1954). Given that organizational teams are generally packed with competent employees to 
achieve a positive synergy, employees under such environments tend to feel pressured to 
improve their performance and make upward instead of downward comparisons. Therefore, 
how upward comparison with more creative coworkers affects the creative performance of 
an individual warrants further study, and some strategies for preventing the negative effects 
and promoting the positive effects of upward comparison must be formulated.  
Therefore, my research examines how the interactions of employees with better-
performing coworkers (i.e., upward social comparison of creative ability) influence their 
creative performance and what are the connecting mechanisms between these two groups. 
I use social comparison theory to test my hypotheses on how the perceived level of creative 
ability relative to coworkers influences an employee’s creativity. To further understand the 
relationship between upward social comparison and individual creativity, I propose 
emotional reactions and cognitive processes as mediating mechanisms of such relationship. 
With an aim to contribute to the literature, I adopt the circumplex model of affect with 
valence and arousal as two axes to describe the emotional reactions to social comparison. 
10 
Social Comparison in Organizational Behavior  
Social comparison is a prominent social cognitive process of “thinking about 
information about one or more other people in relation to the self” (Wood, 1996, p.520). 
In other words, social comparison is (1) an everyday or every-moment process that 
happens among employees (Spence, Ferris, Brown, & Heller, 2011) that (2) pervades 
nearly all aspects of human emotion and behaviors (e.g., subjective well-being, Kross et 
al., 2013; eating disorders and body dissatisfaction, Myers & Crowther, 2009; and self-
enhancement, Wood, Taylor, & Lichtman, 1985).  
Previous studies suggest that “fully understanding human behavior in the workplace 
requires appreciating social comparison processes is far from hyperbole” (Greenberg, 
Ashton–James, & Ashkanasy, 2007, p. 37). The significance of the social comparison 
process in organizational settings has been largely acknowledged. For example, the 
organizational justice literature has acknowledged the comparative nature of justice 
assessment. Judgment of equity perception is based on one’s social comparison with 
his/her coworkers than on general expectations of one’s outcomes (Adams, 1965; Austin, 
1977; Austin, McGinn, & Susmilch, 1980). Meanwhile, from the distributive, procedural, 
and interactional perspectives, justice assessment in organizations is clearly comparative 
in nature. 
Social comparison theory has been successfully applied to understand various 
organizational phenomena and has been empirically validated in different fields of 
organizational research. Practically, the social comparison process is applied to explain 
diverse employee behaviors. Employees use comparison information to assess their own 
performance (Greenberg et al., 2007). For example, how managers evaluate their career 
progression in comparison with that of others can determine their career satisfaction and 
turnover intentions (Eddleston, 2009). Employees in virtual work environments (i.e., 
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working in physically distant locations from their coworkers), where little information is 
available and uncertainty runs high, eagerly seek social comparison information (Conner, 
2003). Previous studies suggest that social comparison can influence affective behavior, 
stress, and leadership in organizations (Greenberg et al., 2007). For instance, subordinates 
in high leader–member exchange relationships tend to make upward comparison with their 
leaders and are prone to upward assimilation, thereby suggesting that these subordinates 
aspire to become like their leaders. Ongoing studies have also demonstrated the practical 
validity of social comparison theory in explaining organizational behaviors. 
Much of the work in contemporary organizations is accomplished by teams, which 
compromises the growing complexity of tasks that frequently exceeds the capacity of 
individuals (Cooke et al., 2003). Previous studies have defined a team as “a 
distinguishable set of two or more people who interact dynamically, interdependently, and 
adaptively toward a common and valued goal/object/mission” (Cooke et al., 2003, p. 180). 
In this sense, increasing the adoption of team systems also increases the role of social 
comparison in various sub-areas of organizational behavior. Given that comparing oneself 
with coworkers is virtually inevitable, the importance of social comparison can never be 
exaggerated. Moreover, despite the importance of social comparison process in 
understanding individuals within an organization, comparison studies remain lacking in 
the organizational behavior literature.  
Social Comparison and Creativity 
With the prevailing adoption of team systems as a major organizational structure and 
the increasing emphasis on creativity as a social process (Perry–Smith & Mannucci, 2017; 
Perry–Smith & Shalley, 2003; Rouse, 2018), creativity is affected by social relationships 
with others in the work community. For example, social relationships, such as the number 
of weak ties, is suggested to be generally beneficial for individual creativity (Perry–Smith 
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& Shalley, 2003). For instance, empirical studies on oil field service companies show that 
supportive supervisors and moods interactively contribute to employee creativity (George 
& Zhou, 2007), while a meta-analysis reveals that an open team climate where members 
are encouraged to socially interact in open discussions generally obtain high creativity 
scores (Ma, 2009). Therefore, the employees’ social interactions with other organizational 
members significantly contribute to creativity in real-world organizations (Amabile, 1988; 
Woodman, Sawyer, & Griffin, 1993).  
Although the importance of social interactions in developing creativity has been well 
acknowledged, extant studies still have a long way to go to achieve a sufficient 
understanding of the social aspect of the creativity process. Specifically, the fact that 
people have the constant innate drive to compare themselves with others suggests that the 
effect of social comparison process on creativity remains obscure. In particular, previous 
studies have demonstrated that social comparison may stimulate individual creativity. 
Given the possible effect of social comparison on employee creativity, an increasing 
number of studies have revealed that social comparison is related to brainstorming 
productivity (e.g., laboratory brainstorming, Dugosh & Paulus, 2005; online brainstorming, 
Michinov & Primois, 2005; Shepherd, Briggs, Reinig, Yen, & Nunamaker, 1995). Idea 
generation at brainstorming or daily work situations is an important basis for creativity 
(Paulus & Yang, 2000). Meanwhile, the effects of implied social comparison situations, 
such as competitions (Amabile, 1982; Conti, Collins, & Picariello, 2001) or rivalries 
(Clydesdale, 2006), on creativity are clearly understood. In contemporary organizations 
with severe competition and fast-changing technologies, creativity plays an indispensable 
role in achieving innovation and effectiveness. However, the link between social 
comparison and individual creativity has been largely neglected in previous research.  
Comparison with others, especially in an organizational context, does not always 
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deliver favorable results. Given that successfully managed teams are characterized by clear 
goals, high standards of excellence, and competent team members, these teams are often 
packed with competent members who are pressured to achieve a clearly defined high goal 
(Fleming & Monda–Amaya, 2001). Therefore, comparison with coworkers may lead to a 
sense of inferiority or incompetency, which in turn may decrease the cognitive and 
behavioral performance of an employee, including his/her creativity. In this case, managers 
must focus on those team members who are suffering from a downside social comparison. 
Despite the growing evidence that supports the relationship between social comparison 
and creativity, very few studies have attempted to clarify such relationship and its 
mechanism. As researchers and organizational managers increasingly focus on improving 
creativity in organizational teams (Choi, 2007; Y. Shin, Kim, Choi, & Lee, 2016), how 
social comparison promotes or impedes creativity in organizations must be understood. 
Therefore, I aim to investigate the effect of social comparison on employee creativity in 
organizational teams and clarify its mechanism. 
Overview of chapters  
To achieve a comprehensive understanding of employee creativity from the social 
comparison perspective, I organize my study as follows. Chapter 1 presents the 
introduction and background of this study. Chapter 2 reviews the related studies and 
presents the theoretical background of this work. This chapter is divided into two sections. 
The first part reviews the creativity studies and highlights the importance of their social 
aspects, while the second part presents an in-depth review of social comparison theory and 
the affective consequences of social comparison. I specifically review recent studies from 
various disciplines in support of the dimensional approach of emotions. Chapter 3 presents 
the theoretical framework along with the research hypotheses and the corresponding 
rationales. Chapter 4 discusses the data collection method, the nature of the sample, the 
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employed measures, and the adopted data analysis strategies. Chapter 5 presents the results 
of the data analysis, including the descriptive statistics and primary analyses involved in 
the hypotheses testing. Chapter 6 presents the overall findings of this work, their theoretical 




CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Review of Creativity Research 
1.1.  Definitions of Creativity 
Since Guilford’s (1950) call for a systematic study on creativity, this concept has 
received much attention from numerous researchers across various disciplines. Creativity 
in an organization is defined as an employee’s generation of novel and useful ideas, 
products, and procedures (Amabile, 1983; Oldham & Cummings, 1996). Creative 
outcomes need to be novel such that the employees’ creative contributions, including 
products, ideas, and practices, must be unique and original. Another aspect that creative 
outcomes need to entail is usefulness; new contributions must provide some value to an 
organization and be relevant to its goals.  
Given that creativity can be used to describe both an outcome and a process (Shalley 
& Zhou, 2008), many researchers have investigated the creative process from different 
aspects. Runco and Chand (1995) proposed a componential model that explains the basic 
components of creative thinking (Figure 1). They identified problem finding, ideation, and 
judgmental process as three sets of skills needed for creative thinking. Problem finding 
involves the identification and definition of problem, ideation represents ideational fluency, 
ideational originality, and ideational flexibility (Guilford, 1967; Torrance, 1966), and 
evaluation refers to the valuation and critical evaluation of an idea. Zhang and Bartol (2010) 
suggested that the creative process involves three aspects of employee involvement, 
namely, problem identification, information searching and encoding, and idea and 
alternative generation. The aforementioned descriptions of the creative process all agree 




Figure 1 Two-tier model of creative thinking (adapted from Runco and Chand, 1995) 
Creativity as an outcome is defined as a combination of three distinct yet interrelated 
components of fluency, originality, and flexibility (Guilford, 1967; Torrance, 1966). 
Originality is one of the defining characteristics suggested by Amabile (1988) that refers 
to the uniqueness of insights, ideas, or solutions. Flexibility refers to the ability to 
“approach a problem or issue from new perspectives” (Rietzschel, De Dreu, & Nijstad, 
2007, p. 856) and can be measured as the number of different categories that a person uses 
in the ideation process. A flexible employee is productive in developing differentially 
classified ideas. For example, when generating ideas for the possible uses of a pen, an 
employee who mentions that the pen can be used as a chopstick, drumstick, and baton is 
more flexible than someone who mentions that a pen can be used to write a poem, thesis, 
and diary entry. Fluency is measured as the number of ideas developed in the same category. 
A person who generates 10 ideas in 1 category is more fluent than a person who generates 
5 ideas in 5 categories. Although a person does not have to be flexible and fluent at the 
same time, s/he must be original in order to be creative because originality or novelty is a 
key characteristic that defines creativity.  
17 
1.2.  Radical and Incremental Creativity 
In the contemporary dynamic business environment, employees and organizations are 
required to respond to creative requirements, which may range from minor adaptations to 
radical breakthroughs (Gilson & Madjar, 2011; Mumford & Gustafson, 1988). Accordingly, 
different types of creativity have been proposed by several researchers (e.g., seven types 
of creativity contributions, Sternberg, 1999; a matrix of four creativity types, Unsworth, 
2001; radical and incremental creativity, Gilson & Madjar, 2011) and each type of 
creativity has different drivers. Researchers continue to overcome the unidimensional view 
of creativity and theorize various types of creativity (e.g., George & Zhou, 2007; Gilson 
& Madjar, 2011; Mumford & Gustafson, 1988; Sternberg, 1999; Unsworth, 2001), thereby 
introducing a wide range of conceptualizations (e.g., routine performance, incremental 
creativity, radical ideas, and major creative contribution). However, one of the most widely 
accepted definitions is that creativity lies on a continuum between the minor adaptation of 
familiar algorithms and radical set-breakings. Accordingly, Gilson and Madjar (2011) 
defined two forms of creativity, namely, incremental creativity and radical changes, of 
which incremental creativity refers to modifications made to existing practices and 
products and radical changes involve revolutionary ideas that substantially transform 
existing practices, processes, or platforms.  
Researchers have commented that distinct processes should lead to different types of 
creativity (Mumford & Gustafson, 1988; Unsworth, 2001). The underlying psychological 
process for major contributions to the organizations, for which employees generate new 
ideas and solutions to various problems, must differ from what is necessary for the minor 
contributions, such as employee extension of their existing knowledge and generation of 
solutions to limited problems (Ghiselin, 1963). With regard to creativity types, previous 
studies reveal that certain processes and antecedents must lead to radical breakthroughs 
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while other processes and antecedents may engender a motivating force for incremental 
changes (Unsworth, 2001).  
Accordingly, Gilson and Madjar (2011) suggested that intrinsic motivation and 
problem-driven, abstract theory-related creative ideas are linked to radical creativity. They 
also revealed that extrinsic motivation and solution-driven, concrete practices-based ideas 
are associated with incremental creativity. Madjar, Greenberg, and Chen (2011) identified 
willingness to take risks, resources for creativity, and career commitment as antecedents 
of radical creativity and added that the presence of creative coworkers and organizational 
identification are significant antecedents of incremental creativity. Meanwhile, Gilson et 
al. (2012) found that supportive supervision is related to incremental creativity and that 
intrinsic motivation is significantly related to radical creativity (Gilson, Lim, D’Innocenzo, 
& Moye, 2012). With regard to the source of knowledge for creativity, Jaussi and Randel 
(2014) found that along with creative self-efficacy, the external search for knowledge is 
related to radical creativity in organizations. Meanwhile, an employee’s search for ideas 
within the organization (i.e., internal search for new ideas) is related to both radical and 
incremental creativity. 
1.3.  Antecedents of Creativity 
Since Amabile (1983), a large number of studies have emerged over the past three 
decades to investigate the predictors and underlying mechanisms of creativity. The 
componential theory of creativity posits four requisites for creativity, including (1) an 
intrinsically (and extrinsically, as in the dynamic componential model of Amabile and Pratt, 
2016) motivated individual with (2) high domain-relevant skills (expertise) and (3) high 
domain-relevant processes (creative thinking) who works in (4) a creativity-supportive 
environment. Based on this theory, scholars have examined various personal and 
contextual variables that promote or inhibit creativity through motivational mechanisms.  
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Initial studies on creativity have investigated various personal variables, including 
biographical factors, personality, cognitive style, and motivational orientations pertinent 
to creativity. These studies have focused on personal characteristics, such as broad interests, 
toleration of ambiguity, and self-confidence, all of which lead to individual creativity 
(Amabile, 1983; Barron & Harrington, 1981; F. D. Davis, 1989). To determine those 
personality factors that lead to creativity, the creative personality scale (Gough, 1979) has 
been developed, and the results indicate that those individuals who are self-confident, have 
wide-ranging interests, and have reflective characteristics show high creative performance 
(Oldham & Cummings, 1996). These studies have also shown that among the five 
personality factors, openness to experience has been consistently linked to higher creativity 
(Feist, 1998, 2019; Silvia et al., 2008). Kirton (1976) suggested that individuals have 
adaptive or innovative cognitive styles (adaption–innovation theory, Kirton, 1976), of 
which the innovative cognitive style is generally related to creativity because innovators 
are willing to take risks that are critical in the development of new solutions (Kirton, 1994; 
Tierney, Farmer, & Graen, 1999). Meanwhile, intrinsic motivation has been consistently 
reported to be positively related with creativity because intrinsically motivated people 
devote their time and effort to identifying problems from numerous perspectives, use 
diverse sources to gather information, and search for various alternatives (Amabile, 1985; 
Hennessey & Amabile, 1998; Zhang & Bartol, 2010).  
Those researchers who show interest in contextual factors that promote individual- or 
group-level creativity have considered broad dimensions of work environments, including 
job and workplace characteristics, relationships with coworkers and supervisors, and 
support and encouragement from groups or organizations (e.g., Amabile, Conti, Coon, 
Lazenby, & Herron, 1996; Amabile & Gryskiewicz, 1989; Isaksen, Lauer, & Ekvall, 1999; 
Tierney et al., 1999; Woodman et al., 1993). The design of jobs has received much attention 
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as an important antecedent of creativity (West & Farr, 1990). If a job is complex (i.e., 
requiring a high level of autonomy, feedback, significance, skill variety, and identity; 
Oldham & Hackman, 1981), then this job is likely to psychologically motivate employees 
and induce them to develop creative ideas (Oldham & Cummings, 1996; Sung, Antefelt, 
& Choi, 2011). Several researchers have examined the relations between the supervisor’s 
leadership style and the employees’ creativity (Amabile et al., 1996; Choi, 2004b; Oldham 
& Cummings, 1996). Supportive supervisors provide their employees with developmental 
and informational feedback, show concern for their feelings, and encourage open 
interactions and employee participation in idea development (Choi, 2004b; Deci, Connell, 
& Ryan, 1989). Supportive leadership has been reported to positively influence the 
intrinsic motivation and creativity of followers (Amabile et al., 1996; Choi, 2004b; 
Oldham & Cummings, 1996; Shalley & Gilson, 2004). By contrast, the controlling 
behavior of leaders negatively affect employee creativity (Zhou, 2003; Zhou & George, 
2001).  
Coworkers or peer group members substantially influence individuals as immediate 
social surroundings. Supportive and nurturing coworkers enhance the intrinsic motivation 
of individuals and promote their creativity (Shalley, Zhou, & Oldham, 2004). For example, 
participative safety provides a non-threatening social environment that encourages the 
exploration of diverse alternatives without the threat of retaliation (Anderson & West, 
1998). An open group climate can increase creative self-efficacy, which in return boosts 
creative performance (Choi, 2004). Amabile et al. (1996) found that supportive and 
encouraging coworkers can help boost employee creativity, while Zhou and George (2001) 
revealed that coworker support and informational feedback promote employee creativity.  
By integrating the personal and environmental predictors of creativity, researchers 
have attempted to identify the psychological process model of creativity (Choi, 2004b; Liu, 
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Jiang, Shalley, Keem, & Zhou, 2016; Oldham & Cummings, 1996; Shalley et al., 2004). 
Oldham and Cummings (1996) posited that when provided with a supportive environment 
(supportive, non-controlling supervision), individuals with a creative personality 
demonstrate the highest level of creativity when performing motivating jobs (high job 
complexity). By focusing on the importance of social and contextual factors, Shalley et al. 
(2004) suggested that contextual conditions and personal characteristics may affect 
creativity through intrinsic motivation (Shalley et al., 2004). Personal and contextual 
factors have also been empirically validated to affect creative performance through 
creative self-efficacy and creativity intention (Choi, 2004b). In their recent meta-analytic 
examination, Liu et al. (2016) proposed motivational mechanisms, including personal and 
contextual predictors, that influence creativity through intrinsic motivation, prosocial 
motivation, and creative self-efficacy (Liu et al., 2016).  
Despite the plethora of studies on creativity, these works have either viewed 
individuals as independent entities and investigate within-individual processes or examine 
collective processes involving group- or organizational-level creativity; meanwhile, only 
few studies have examined the interactive mechanism among members, which is 
ubiquitous in organizations. Contemporary organizations are characterized by their high 
dependency on team systems, where the vast majority of tasks are accomplished via 
teamwork. Although the notion of creativity as a social process has been widely accepted 
(Perry–Smith & Mannucci, 2017; Rouse, 2018), the importance of inter-member dynamics, 
including the social comparison process, has been neglected in the literature. Creative work 
is a social process that can be promoted through the effective inter-member dynamics with 
coworkers, and the increasing dependence of contemporary organizations on team systems 
emphasize the importance of interactive processes among team members. Therefore, the 
chasm between social comparison process and creativity must be bridged. 
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1.4.  Emotion and Creativity  
Among the many variables that are shown to predict creativity, “mood stands out as 
one of the most widely studied and least disputed predictors” (Baas et al., 2008, p. 779; De 
Dreu et al., 2008, p. 739). According to Baas et al. (2008), emotional states have long been 
accepted as one of the most influential prerequisites of creativity. Early studies on emotion 
and creativity tend to focus on the role of positive or negative mood in the ideation process. 
Initially, positive mood shows a positive association with creativity (Baas et al., 2008; M. 
A. Davis, 2009). Previous studies reveal that positive mood informs the individual that 
s/he is in a safe and satisfactory situation where s/he may resort to loose and heuristic 
processing with broadened attention (Forgas, 1995). Positive mood motivates people to 
approach difficult tasks and encourages them to explore flexible, inclusive, and novel 
processes (Fiedler, 1988, 2000). For example, happy-induced undergraduate participants 
show much broader and inclusive cognitive categories compared with the control group 
(Isen & Daubman, 1984). Previous studies have also shown that positive affect promotes 
unusual construct associations, thereby leading to high cognitive flexibility and low 
perseverance (Baas et al., 2008).  
By contrast, negative mood signals that the focal person is in an undesirable situation, 
thereby reducing his/her attentional focus and motivating him/her to stick to established 
strategies. Some studies reveal that negative mood negatively influences creativity 
(Baumann & Kuhl, 2002; Vosburg, 1998). For example, in an experimental study with a 
high-level intuition task, those participants that experience the negative affect show 
reduced access to extended semantic networks, thereby impeding their creative 
performance (Baumann & Kuhl, 2002). However, findings of previous research are 
controversial in that some researchers argue that negative and neutral moods show no 
differences in relation to creativity (Göritz & Moser, 2003; Verhaeghen, Joormann, & Khan, 
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2005). Moreover, other studies reveal that negative mood states, which lead people to 
utilize strict, systematic, and detailed information processing and drives their tendency to 
process concrete external information, promote creative performance (Carlsson, Wendt, & 
Risberg, 2000; Clapham, 2001; George & Zhou, 2002, 2007; Kaufmann, 2003). For 
instance, when clear information is provided (which indicates the appropriateness of 
modifying the current strategy), individuals in a sad mood are more ready to change their 
strategies compared with those in a happy mood (Gasper, 2003). With these mixed results, 
some studies even assert that negative mood does not affect creativity (Grawitch, Munz, 
Elliott, & Mathis, 2003).  
However, although positive moods are generally accepted to be associated with 
creativity, the empirical results vary depending on the activation level. For example, while 
a high-activated positive mood plays a critical role in inducing innovative behavior 
(Madrid, Patterson, Birdi, Leiva, & Kausel, 2014), some positive yet deactivating moods, 
such as relaxation and sereneness, do not agree with this result (Baas et al., 2008). 
Moreover, people in a negative and deactivating mood, such as sadness or depression, 
demonstrate a weakened engagement with the environment, thereby reducing their 
creativity (Baas et al., 2008; Henriques, Glowacki, & Davidson, 1994), while activated 
negative affects increase cognitive persistence and perseverance (Brehm, 1999; Carver, 
2004), foster the generation of original solutions and realization of new ideas (Montani, 
Dagenais–Desmarais, Giorgi, & Grégoire, 2018), and sometimes help engender changes 
and therefore stimulate creativity (Frijda, 1988; George & Zhou, 2002; L. L. Martin & 
Stoner, 1996). Such inconsistency clearly shows that a hedonic tone does not explain 
creativity alone and that the interaction of a hedonic tone with activation must be 
considered (Baas et al., 2008; Montani et al., 2018). Therefore, an alternative explanation 
for the mood–creativity link through the interactive role of hedonic tone and activation 
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must be proposed (De Dreu et al., 2008).  
1.5.  Dual Pathway to Creativity 
The model of dual pathway to creativity has been proposed to explain the mixed 
effects of positive and negative moods on creative performance. This model identifies 
cognitive flexibility and cognitive persistence as two possible ways to achieve creativity 
(De Dreu et al., 2008).  
Flexibility, which has been previously reported as a component of creativity, is also 
an important cognitive process toward creative outcomes (De Dreu et al., 2008). People 
can achieve creativity through unusual and distant associations made from flat associative 
hierarchies (e.g., Eysenck, 1993; Mednick, 1962), set-breaking (e.g., Duncker, 1945; S. M. 
Smith & Blankenship, 1991; S. M. Smith, Ward, & Schumacher, 1993), and cognitive 
restructuring (or flexible thinking). Apart from being a measure of creativity, cognitive 
flexibility can be a precursor of the fluency of unique ideas. Therefore, cognitive flexibility 
is one of the dual pathways to creativity (De Dreu et al., 2008). 
Creativity often requires employees with a high level of effort and persistence (e.g., 
Staw, 1995). Although they may lack diverse categories and broad perspectives, being 
persistent and hardworking entail the generation of many ideas. The fluent development 
of ideas within a few categories will, after all the conventional and typical ideas have been 
suggested, produce a plethora of original ideas. Therefore, cognitive persistence is another 
pathway to creativity suggested in the dual pathway model. 
Taken together, creativity can be achieved by flexibly switching among broad and 
inclusive cognitive categories and perspectives and by using remote associations, which in 
turn enhances one’s cognitive flexibility to achieve creative insights and ideas. At the same 
time, creative ideas, insights, and solutions can be achieved through persistence and 
perseverance, which can be manifested as engaging in hard work and devoting much time 
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and effort in a systematic and structured in-depth exploration of a relatively small number 
of cognitive categories.  
To further elaborate the mixed relationship between mood and creativity, the dual 
pathway model adopts the activation of mood state, which fosters creativity in many 
disciplines (e.g., Dietrich, 2004; Dreisbach et al., 2005). Through the release of organic 
chemicals such as dopamine and noradrenaline, activation or arousal is associated with an 
improved working memory capacity, which subsequently affects a series of work-related 
performances (De Dreu et al., 2008, p. 741). A high level of working memory capacity 
corresponds to a greater ability to stay focused on the problem and maintain a large number 
of items as active as they rely on one’s attentive ability to utilize information (Engle, 2002). 
Through the improvement of working memory capacity, activated mood state is related to 
a highly flexible, strategic, abstract, and fast process, which in turn results in increased 
creativity (George & Zhou, 2007).  
The hedonic tone of activated mood states is related to one of the aforementioned dual 
pathways. When activated, positive affect promotes cognitive flexibility by promoting 
uncommon perspectives, inclusive thinking, and frequent switches among several 
categories; by contrast, when activated, negative affect is related to less attention shifting, 
less flexibility, and a detail-oriented systematic and analytical thinking. Therefore, the 
activated negative affect is related to cognitive persistence.   
 
Figure 2 Dual pathway model (De Dreu, Baas, & Nijstad, 2008, printed with permission) 
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In sum, activating positive emotion enhances creativity by stimulating flexibility, 
while activating negative emotional state promotes creativity by stimulating persistence 
(Baas et al., 2008; De Dreu et al., 2008; Nijstad, De Dreu, Rietzschel, & Baas, 2010). 
Individuals in a positive and activated emotional state (e.g., happy and elated) show an 
increased cognitive flexibility, which in turn promotes their fluency and originality, while 
people in a positive yet deactivating emotional state (e.g., relaxed) show little creativity 
(De Dreu et al., 2008). In addition, those people in negative and activated emotional states 
(e.g., afraid and anxious) show improved fluency and originality through persistence, 
while those who are in negative and deactivated emotional states (e.g., sad) show little 
creativity (Baas et al., 2008). In the case of negative emotions, an increase in cognitive 
persistence and perseverance, instead of flexibility, promotes creativity (Baas et al., 2008; 
De Dreu et al., 2008).  
 
2. Review of Social Comparison Theory 
2.1.  Definition of Social Comparison  
Social comparison is a major concern in human life. Festinger (1954) introduced social 
comparison theory as an extension of earlier informal social communication theories 
(Festinger, 1950). In his informal social communication theory, Festinger (1950) argued 
that people tend to communicate their opinions with group members because there are 
pressures towards conformity of opinions among a group. By using nine hypotheses and 
eight corollaries, Festinger developed his theory into social comparison theory (Festinger, 
1954), which formed the basis for succeeding comparison studies. Social comparison 
(Festinger, 1954) has been defined as the “process of thinking about information about one 
or more other people in relation to the self” (Wood, 1996). Originally, this theory is used 
to explain the social process among individuals who use similar others to meet their needs 
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to evaluate their own abilities and opinions, thereby generating pressures toward 
uniformity. When evaluating one’s opinion or abilities via objective, non-social means is 
not feasible, people often compare themselves with similar others to fulfill their needs of 
self-evaluation (S. E. Taylor, Buunk, & Aspinwall, 1990). In later studies, the definition of 
social comparison has been expanded to “any process that individuals relate their own 
characteristics to those of others” (Buunk & Gibbons, 2000, p. 491).  
2.2.  Upward and Downward Comparison 
Concerning the comparison of abilities, Festinger (1954) proposed a distinctive 
feature. Social comparison theory suggests a “unidirectional drive upward,” which 
suggests that people strive to improve their performance and want to be more capable than 
the persons with whom they are comparing themselves (Festinger, 1954). This struggle for 
self-improvement can be achieved by comparing oneself with better people and identify 
areas of improvement.  
Although Festinger initially proposed the similarity hypothesis, which posits that 
individuals seek similar others to compare themselves with because they are the best source 
of self-evaluation (Festinger, 1954; J. Suls & Wheeler, 2000), his subsequent emphasis on 
other motivations of comparison, such as self-improvement and self-enhancement, has 
shifted the focus of comparison to upward and downward comparisons. 
The initial experiment of Hakmiller (1966) and the rank-order paradigm and 
integrative research of Wills (1981, downward comparison theory) shifted the research 
interest from self-assessment to self-enhancement. Wills (1986) argued that when facing 
threats, downward comparisons generate a positive affect that is essential for self-
enhancement. For the purpose of self-enhancement, performing a downward comparison 
to someone worse off than oneself presents an effective way for one to protect his/her self-
esteem. Threatened individuals who need self-enhancement can benefit from downward 
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comparisons to improve their subjective well-being and self-esteem, reduce their anxiety, 
and generate a positive affect (Crocker & Gallo, 1985; Gibbons, 1986; Hakmiller, 1966; 
Morse & Gergen, 1970; Wills, 1981). 
By contrast, an upward comparison to someone better off than oneself is assumed to 
negatively affect subjective well-being because such comparison diminishes one’s self-
esteem and generates a negative affect (Buunk & Gibbons, 2000; Wood, 1989). People 
frequently express anger and resentment when they discover that similar others are better 
off than themselves. For instance, exposure to thin and idealized body images can increase 
one’s negative mood and body dissatisfaction (Tiggemann & McGill, 2004). Some 
researchers found that people avoid upward comparisons after encountering failure (Marsh 
& Parker, 1984; Marsh, Trautwein, Lüdtke, & Köller, 2008) and that upward comparisons 
in terms of ability is associated with negative mood (Gibbons & Gerrard, 1989) can lead 
to negative affect (Gibbons & Gerrard, 1989; Nadler & Fisher, 1986) and jealousy (Salovey 
& Rodin, 1984).  
However, the subsequent research has challenged this prototypical view, that is, 
downward comparison does not always result in positive feelings. For example, those 
individuals with chronic illnesses feel threatened when they compare themselves with 
patients who are facing more serious illnesses (Wood et al., 1985). Taylor and Lobel (1989) 
argued that individuals may benefit from both upward and downward comparisons when 
they feel threatened. Specifically, they suggested that individuals enhance self-esteem from 
downward comparison and gain inspiration and information through upward comparison. 
Moreover, although the negative effects of upward comparison have been frequently 
reported, recent studies have predicted positive shifts after comparing oneself with superior 
others (R. L. Collins, 1996; Mussweiler & Strack, 2000). Thin body images presented in 
the media may inspire individuals when they have strengthened thinness attainability 
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beliefs, thereby shifting their self-perception toward a positive direction (Mills, Polivy, 
Herman, & Tiggemann, 2002; Yu, Damhorst, & Russell, 2011). In line with this, Buunk et 
al. (1990) proposed that both upward and downward comparisons can be self-enhancing 
and suggested that whether individuals feel positive or negative after a comparison 
depends on dispositional and situational factors.  
2.3.  Affective Consequences of Social Comparison 
Buunk et al. (1990) demonstrated that upward and downward comparisons may have 
both positive and negative effects and asserted that “affective consequences of a 
comparison are not intrinsic to its direction” (Buunk, Collins, Taylor, VanYperen, & Dakof, 
1990, p. 1239). Facing someone who is better off than oneself delivers two pieces of 
information, namely, (a) that one is not as well-off as the other people and (b) that one can 
improve himself/herself as a comparison target. Those people who focus on the fact that 
they can improve themselves feel positive after the comparison, while those who focus on 
the negative side feel worse after the comparison. Conversely, knowing that other people 
are worse off than oneself presents two possible stories, that is, (a) that one’s standing is 
better than that of other people and (b) that one’s status may grow worse. An individual 
who focuses on the bright side feel positively about his/her current status, while someone 
who focuses on the negative side will feel worse. Therefore, the affective responses to 
upward or downward comparison depends on how the information is construed and not on 
the direction of comparison (Burleson, Leach, & Harrington, 2005; Morry & Sucharyna, 
2016).  
The affective consequences of social comparison have recently attracted much 
research interest along with the mechanism for each affective reaction (e.g., Buunk et al., 
1990; Smith, 2000). Smith (2000) presented a theoretical typology for classifying affective 
reactions to social comparisons depending on several dimensions, including the (a) 
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direction of comparison (whether the comparison is upward or downward), (b) the 
desirability of the self and the other (whether the comparison result is desirable or 
undesirable), (c) the focus of attention (including self, other, and dual focus), and (d) the 
contrastive versus assimilative nature of the reaction (which is largely determined by 
perceived control) (Richard H. Smith, 2000). Consistent with Smith, Buunk et al. (2005) 
proposed three dimensions that underlie affective reactions to social comparison, namely, 
(a) the direction of comparison (i.e., upward or downward), (b) the contrast versus 
identification nature of reaction, and (c) the focus of attention (only self and others) (Buunk, 
Kuyper, & van der Zee, 2005). According to these studies, the affective reactions to social 
comparison can be explained by the comparison types presented above. For example, a 
student who is manipulated to perform an upward comparison demonstrates hope most 
frequently if s/he identifies with the comparison target (Buunk, Kuyper, et al., 2005). 
Bunker et al. (2005) and Smith (2000) have generated 15 and 8 types of discrete emotions, 
respectively (Figure 3).  
Although the results of these two studies coincide in a few categories (i.e., resentment, 
worry, and contempt), they adopted different discrete emotions for analyzing the other 
categories. Smith (2000) mentioned that although he focused on emotions that are 
“considered to be the most obvious cases of social comparison-based emotions,” a deeper 
investigation into the other emotions is needed because “other candidate emotions may fit 
better” (Smith, 2000, p. 195). Buunk et al. (2005) argued that some discrepancies in their 
findings may be merely semantic (hope vs. optimism; compassion vs. pity) while the other 
differences may be more substantive. They also called for a further investigation into the 
social comparison mechanism of affective reaction and a broader coverage of the other 




Figure 3 Affective responses to social comparison, adapted from Buunk et al. (2005) 
The mixed use of discrete emotions impedes a thorough understanding of affective 
reactions to social comparison as these emotions sometimes create confusion between 
terms and provide only a partial understanding of the emotional span. Although both of 
these authors, who opened the door for researchers to understand the affective 
consequences of the social comparison process, have emphasized the need to investigate a 
broader array of emotions, very few studies have attempted to understand emotional 
reactions as a whole. Therefore, the call for examining a wider variety of emotions remains 
unanswered.  
2.4.  Focus on Upward Comparison  
Upward and downward social comparisons have desirable and undesirable effects for 
employees. In general, people choose to engage in upward comparison even when their 
self-esteem is threatened. A recent meta-analysis reveals that selection studies “showed a 
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strong preference… for upward choices when there was no threat; there was no evidence 
for downward comparison... even when threatened” (Gerber, Wheeler, & Suls, 2018, p. 
177, ellipses added). In terms of abilities, people tend to compare themselves with slightly 
better others as implied in the “unidirectional drive upward” concept (Festinger, 1954) 
because they strive to improve themselves and be more capable than those persons with 
whom they are comparing themselves (Taylor et al., 1990, p. 75). In organizations where 
promotion and reward are determined by comparing the abilities of coworkers, employees 
tend to focus on superior others and aim to improve themselves instead of seeking for 
psychological comfort by comparing themselves with inferior coworkers.  
In contemporary organizations, managers tend to form teams that comprise 
experienced and capable employees (Fleming & Monda–Amaya, 2001). However, such 
setup only creates a situation where employees are frequently compared with excellent 
coworkers. Although an upward comparison may produce a short-term negative effect, 
such as a negative affect (e.g. Nadler & Fisher, 1986), organizational teams filled with 
capable and confident employees, which may frequently induce upward comparison, are 
usually expected to produce fruitful results.  
An upward comparison may benefit organizations in several ways. For instance, 
upward comparison provides useful information about self-improvement (Buunk & 
Ybema, 1997) by allowing individuals to observe excelling others, which in turn will 
motivate them to improve themselves. Viewing the others’ success may also encourage 
people to believe that they can achieve the same degree of success, thereby motivating 
them to exert additional effort in their tasks to achieve their goals. For example, by 
observing the superior performance of a coworker, an employee may sense his/her own 
potential and set higher goals to achieve superiority (Buunk, Collins, Taylor, VanYperen, 
et al., 1990; Lockwood & Kunda, 1997; Major, Testa, & Bylsma, 1991; Wheeler, Martin, 
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& Suls, 1997). People may also identify themselves with superior others, such as leaders, 
try to mimic their behavior (Bandura, 1986; Greenberg et al., 2007), set personal goals that 
are as high as those of better performers, and exert additional effort in their tasks to achieve 
such goals (Seta, 1982). 
Despite serving as a source of self-confidence and other positive outcomes, upward 
comparison can also be a source of stress and low self-esteem. Instead of gaining 
confidence in their potential, employees may be discouraged by the differences in their 
achievements. For example, those successful students who have no choice but to perform 
downward comparisons with regular students may engage in unfavorable upward social 
comparisons after moving to an advanced program, thereby leading to negative effects 
(Marsh, Köller, & Baumert, 2001). Discouragement and stress are among the overriding 
drivers of low performance. Therefore, it is important in effective team functioning for 
managers to understand the process through which upward comparison may have positive 
or negative affective reactions, and induce their employees to show positive reactions. 
Moreover, managers must care for those employees who face stress after an upward 
comparison instead of those employees who become more confident and happier after a 
downward comparison. Therefore, the concerns relating to upward comparison warrants a 
thorough examination.  
2.5.  Discrete Emotion to Emotion Circumplex Model  
Emotional phenomena are very diverse and complex that they cannot be easily 
captured in a single model or theory. The definition and classification of emotional states 
have been examined in many studies. In this dissertation, I briefly review two emotion 
approaches, namely, the discrete emotion approach and the dimensional approach, and 
discuss the recent theoretical developments across different disciplines in support of the 
dimensional approach.  
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2.5.1. Discrete Emotions 
Two major approaches have been developed for classifying emotional states. The first 
of these approaches is the categorical or the discrete emotion approach, which posits that 
only a limited number of distinct emotions are universal and innate (Izard, 1992, 1994). 
Each discrete emotion has distinctive characteristics, goals, and action tendencies 
(Roseman, Wiest, & Swartz, 1994). Two groups of researchers have used this approach to 
determine basic emotions. Basic emotion theorists claim that some basic emotions are 
“evolutionary determined” (Izard, 1992; Plutchik, 1984), whereas modern cognitive 
theorists posit that some “modal emotions” are not necessarily evolutionary determined 
but are most salient in contemporary people’s lives (Scherer, 1994).  
The discrete emotion model has been widely used in previous social comparison 
research, whereas the most widely known and accepted discrete emotions are taken from 
the differential emotions theory of Izard (DET, Izard, 1977), who identified 10 emotions 
based on facial expressions (i.e., anger, disgust, contempt, interest, joy, surprise, sadness, 
fear, shyness, and guilt). DET defines emotions as “feeling state or motivational condition” 
that are “direct and immediate products of neural processes associated with that emotion” 
(Izard, 1992, p. 561). Izard claimed that emotions can be distinguished by facial 
expressions and proposed some basic emotions based on the facial expressions of 
participants. The emotions identified by DET can be measured by using the differential 
emotions scale developed by Izard (1977, p. 126).  
Ekman (1992) identified six basic types of emotions with unique facial expressions, 
physiology, and triggering events. Specifically, he proposed happiness, surprise, sadness, 
anger, disgust, and fear as distinguishable emotions that are represented as scales in the 
facial action coding system (Ekman & Friesen, 1976, 1978), which “can be used to 
describe any facial movement” in images or videos (Ekman & Friesen, 1976, p. 56). To 
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proficiently observe anatomy-based action units and determine emotions, one must engage 
in a 40-hour training or self-instruction (Ekman & Friesen, 1976). 
2.5.2. Dimensional Approach 
The dimensional or “emotion circumplex” approach posits two or more bipolar 
dimensions on a circumplex that can be applied to describe any emotional state. All 
emotions can be represented as a point on an n-dimensional space described in each theory.  
The dimensional approach was first introduced by Wundt (1896), who provided a 
structural description of subjective feelings in three dimensions (pleasure, tension and 
inhibition). After Wundt (1896) pioneered the dimensional approach to the emotional states, 
various researchers proposed circumplex models. 
Russell’s (1980) circumplex model of affect is one of the most popular and widely 
used models for capturing emotions. According to this model, affect can be described on a 
bipolar dimension with two axes, namely, pleasure versus misery and arousal versus sleep. 
Between the axis of valence and arousal, emotions such as excitement, relaxation, 
depression, and distress are located in a circle. 
 









Larsen and Diener (1992) proposed a dimensional model with the bipolar dimensions 
of activation and pleasantness. Between the high versus low activation axis and the 
pleasant versus unpleasant axis, moods are divided into activated pleasant, unactivated 
pleasant, unactivated unpleasant, and activated unpleasant.  
Watson and Tellegen’s (1985) positive and negative affect schedule (PANAS) adopts 
two distinct unipolar scales, namely, the positive affect and negative affect, and combined 
arousal and hedonic tone in each axis. Highly positive affect refers to highly positive 
emotional states with high arousal, whereas highly negative affect refers to negative 
emotional states with high arousal. According to the PANAS model, positive and negative 
affects are two orthogonal unipolar dimensions and not the two ends of a bipolar dimension.  
 
Figure 5 Circumplex model of affect (Larsen & Diener 1992) combined with the PANAS model 
(Watson & Tellegen 1985) 
Thayer (1989) developed a circumplex model by splitting activation into energetic 
arousal and tense arousal. One axis of this model represents energy and tiredness, while 
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the other axis represents tension and calmness. According to Thayer (1989), these two 
arousal axes are psychologically and physiologically distinct. For example, a person can 
feel high tension and low energetic arousal when s/he is about to hear the final sentence 
from a judge. By contrast, a person may feel high energetic arousal with low tense arousal 
when s/he is planning for a one-month vacation around Europe.  
By adopting the notion that emotions are determined by appraisal, Scherer (2005) 
provided an alternative dimensional model of emotions with the two major appraisal 
dimensions of goal conduciveness and coping potential. In his emotion circumplex that 
includes the axes of valence and arousal, Russell (1983) superimposed a 2D structure with 
goal conduciveness (conducive/obstructive) and coping potential (control/power) with a 
45° rotation. These dimensions are shown in Figure 6 along with some terms of emotions 
mapped on the circumplexes developed by Russell (1983) and Schere (2005).  
 
Figure 6 Alternative dimensional structure of emotions, adapted from Scherer (2005) 
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2.5.3. Discrete Emotion to Dimensional Approach 
Following the abundance of related theories and models, a growing amount of 
evidence highlights the dimensional approach as the most suitable method for describing 
the affective state. Previous studies on the core affect and psychological construction of 
emotions have also identified the dimensional approach as the most suitable approach for 
describing core affect (Russell, 2003). In their meta-analysis of mood–creativity research, 
Baas et al. (2008) asserted that emotions can best be described by the 2D model and that 
“growing evidence from research on self-reported mood and neurophysiological research 
suggests that the affective space can be parsed using pleasure on the one hand and 
activation on the other” (Baas et al., 2008, p. 782).  
Studies in the neurophysiological discipline have called for researchers to use the 
circumplex model of emotion with valence and arousal on its axes. They suggest that all 
affective states can be understood as cognitive interpretations of core neural sensations in 
the brain that are determined by independent neurophysiological systems (Posner, Russell, 
& Peterson, 2005). They also propose a circumplex model that opposes the previous 
theories of basic emotions and suggest that each emotion is determined by a discrete and 
independent neural system. They argue that “basic emotion theories no longer explain 
adequately the vast number of empirical observations from studies in affective 
neuroscience” and that “a conceptual shift is needed in the empirical approaches taken to 
the study of emotion” (Posner et al., 2005, p. 715). 
Following this argument, an experimental study reveals that affective states emerge 
from the interpretations of the two dimensions of arousal and valence. In their experiment, 
Gerber A. J. et al. (2008) presented their participants with pictures of human faces. After 
each picture disappeared from their view, the participants were asked to indicate on a 2D 
grid the point that best describes the feeling expressed in the picture they have seen. In this 
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grid, the x-axis indicates valence, while the y-axis indicates arousal. By analyzing scanned 
brain images, Gerber A.J. et al. (2008) found that distinct neural systems subserve the two 
dimensions of affect–arousal and valence.  
In music psychology, a comparative study of the discrete and dimensional model of 
emotions in music reveals that the 2D model can best explain the perceived emotions in 
music (Eerola & Vuoskoski, 2011). In this study, 116 non-musicians were asked to rate 
110 music excerpts, with each excerpt representing 5 discrete emotions (i.e., anger, fear, 
sadness, happiness, and tenderness) and 6 extremes of 3 bipolar dimensions (i.e., valence, 
energy arousal, tension arousal). Perceived emotions can best be represented in a 2D model 
with the two central dimensions of valence and arousal. A comparison of the discrete, 2D, 
and 3D models of emotions reveals that while the dimensional model can offer a better 
explanation of emotions, the 3D model can be reduced to the 2D model without 
significantly damaging the goodness of fit. The experiment results indicate that the discrete 
emotion model demonstrates poor resolution in characterizing ambiguous emotions.  
As can be seen from the comparable studies of Buunk et al. (2005) and Smith (2000), 
using discrete emotion restrains the understanding of emotions in specific contexts, 
because this approach considers emotions in the same dimension as different constructs. 
For example, for the upward comparison–identification situation focused on the self, 
Buunk et al. (2005) identified “hope” as a resulting emotion, whereas Smith (2000) 
identified “optimism” as the resulting affective state. Moreover, the affective reactions to 
an external situation can better be depicted as a certain area rather than a single point on a 
directional map (Han & Cha, 2017). In this case, emotions can be more reasonably 
presented on a circumplex than by using preset discrete emotion terms.   
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Figure 7 Emotional region (Han & Cha 2017, printed with permission) 
Following the recent findings and arguments, studies on social comparison and 
creativity, which have conventionally focused on discrete emotions or positive/negative 
affectivity, must move away from the basic emotion model of affective state, which 
considers that all emotions are derived from a limited number of universal and basic 
emotions (e.g., anger, fear, disgust, sadness, and happiness; Ekman, 1992, 1999), to a 
dimensional model of emotions.  
2.6.  Possible Determinants of the Affective Consequences of Social Comparison 
According to Buunk et al. (1990, p. 1239), the affective consequences of social 
comparison are not intrinsic to their direction. How one feels about the comparison 
depends on how s/he construes the information obtained from the comparison results. The 
affective implications of upward and downward comparison can be influenced by various 
moderating factors, and numerous studies have proposed potential moderators (Buunk, 
Collins, Taylor, VanYperen, et al., 1990).  
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According to the transactional model of stress, the reactions of individuals to stressful 
events are determined by their appraisal of (a) the threat imposed by an event (primary 
appraisal) and (b) their ability to cope with the event (secondary appraisal) (Lazarus & 
Folkman, 1984). Researchers have attempted to interpret the reactions of individuals to 
social comparison based on this framework. 
Lazarus and Folkman (1984) defined stress as the imbalance between an individual 
and his/her environment; the stressors produced by the environment result in perceived 
demands, and the ability of individuals to cope with stressors responds to such demands. 
When the perceived demands from the environment are strengthened, people become 
aroused and prepare themselves to meet the external requirements. When their perceived 
ability to cope with the demand is high enough to respond to the requirements, then people 
will develop positive expectations about their achievements. 
The relevance of the comparison dimension is among the earliest suggested 
moderators of the affective consequences of social comparison (Tesser, 1986; Tesser & 
Collins, 1988) given that such relevance is an important criterion for determining whether 
the comparison result is threatening or not (Major et al., 1991). Early studies suggest that 
an upward comparison on a relevant dimension may decrease an individual’s self-
evaluation, thereby producing a negative affect. Relevance was usually studied as a 
potential moderator with closeness or similarity with a comparison other in a number of 
studies (Major et al., 1991; Nadler, Fisher, & Itzhak, 1983; Salovey & Rodin, 1984; Tesser, 
Millar, & Moore, 1988), but perceived similarity has been identified as a moderator that 
does “not necessarily mean that a social comparison will have psychological impact” 
(Major et al., 1991, p. 244). 
Perceived control over the outcome can also influence the effects of social comparison 
through a secondary appraisal process in which people determine their ability to cope with 
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the threat from the comparison result (Major et al., 1991). The effects of implied social 
comparison, such as relative deprivation or inequity, is also influenced by the perceived 
control of individuals (Crosby, 1976; Singer, 1981). Both the perceived control over 
comparison discrepancies and the attainability of a comparable other’s superiority have 
been identified as influential factors in many empirical studies (e.g., Argo, White, & Dahl, 
2006; Lockwood & Kunda, 1997; Nadler & Fisher, 1986; Stewart, Chipperfield, Ruthig, 
& Heckhausen, 2013). 
2.6.1. Relevance of the Comparison Dimension 
According to the transactional model of stress (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984), the 
individuals’ responses to stressful situations differ depending on their appraisal. By using 
the coping framework, Major, Testa, and Bylsma (1991) proposed that the esteem–
relevance of the social comparison domain influences the primary appraisal of the 
comparison situation as either threatening or not. They added that an upward comparison 
with a similar other on a self-relevant dimension is the most esteem-threatening, although 
perceived similarity can be distorted to protect self-esteem.  
In a similar vein, Tesser, Millar, and Moore (1988) evaluated computer-administered 
tasks as either highly or lowly relevant to undergraduate students who were recruited as 
pairs of friends. When a close friend outperforms the other in a high-relevance task, the 
self-esteem of students is threatened, thereby resulting in negative emotions. By contrast, 
when a close friend outperforms the other in a low-relevance task, the students do not feel 
any threat from the upward comparison and instead feel a positive affect at the success of 
their close friends. Salovey and Rodin (1984) performed an experiment where 
undergraduate students are given feedback on a bogus test. In their upward comparison 
with close others on a high self-relevance task, the participants showed more negative 
moods compared with those in other situations.  
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When the participants received help from close others on self-relevant tasks (which 
creates an implied upward situation), they felt threatened and showed a negative affect 
(Nadler, Fisher & Ben–Itzhak, 1983). These participants considered such act as an aversive 
and self-threatening experience and demonstrated the least favorable affect and self-
evaluation. By contrast, those who received help twice from a good friend on an ego-
irrelevant task perceived such act as a positive and supportive experience and demonstrated 
the most favorable affect and self-evaluation. When competing with others, the implied 
self-relevant aspect of the competing situation, despite being virtual in nature, only make 
those people who are facing an upward comparison feel more threatened (Brickman & 
Bulman, 1977; Mettee & Smith, 1977).  
In their national longitudinal study on the thoughts and lives of students, Shernoff et 
al. (2014) measured instructional relevance in relation to student engagement, attention, 
and quality of experience. High school students reported higher engagement in relevant 
activities yet showed a poor quality of experience in these activities. These students also 
enjoyed art class (the subject with the least relevance) the most and felt negatively about 
math (the subject with the highest relevance).  
Generally, self-evaluation faces more threats when individuals are outperformed in a 
high self-relevance domain than in a low self-relevance domain (e.g., Morf & Rhodewalt, 
1993; Tesser et al., 1988). Some studies reveal that the combination of closeness and self-
relevance poses the greatest threat to self-esteem, thereby generating strong negative 
reactions (e.g., Nadler et al., 1983; Salovey & Rodin, 1984; Tesser, 1988; Tesser & Collins, 
1988; Tesser et al., 1988), but it is self-relevance that has psychological impact rather than 
closeness (Major et al., 1991, p.244).  
Previous studies, most of which were experimented with students (e.g., Shernoff, 
Csikzentmihalyi, Schneider, & Steele Shernoff, 2014; Tesser, 1988; Tesser & Collins, 1988; 
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Tesser et al., 1988), suggest that an upward comparison in an esteem-relevant domain leads 
to a negative affect while an upward comparison in an irrelevant domain leads to a positive 
affect from “reflected glory.” Although individuals may bask in a reflected glory resulting 
from the excellent performance of their close friends (Tesser et al., 1988) or the positive 
image of their organizations (Dutton, Dukerich, & Harquail, 1994), basking in glory is 
highly unlikely in certain circumstances. For example, an organizational employee may 
not feel any pleasant emotions from the excellent performance of his/her team members. 
In organizational teams, members compete with one another (Fletcher, Major, & Davis, 
2008) and their reward and career success is determined by their own performance relative 
to others. In a similar vein, upward comparison in a relevant domain does not always lead 
to negative responses. When the superior performance of a comparable other in a esteem-
relevant domain seems attainable, the consequences may be inspiring and positive instead 
of negative and demoralizing. Lockwood and Kunda (1997) argued that knowing of a 
superstar in a relevant domain may have a positive effect. Although Tesser’s (1988) self-
evaluation maintenance model asserts that superstars in a relevant domain are supposed to 
evoke negative feelings, the attainable success of a superstar provokes self-enhancement 
and inspiration (Lockwood & Kunda, 1997). Therefore, to fully understand the affective 
responses to upward comparison, the attainability of the comparison dimension must be 
considered along with domain relevance. 
2.6.2. Perceived Attainability   
Following Festinger (1954), many social comparison studies have investigated whom 
people select as comparison others under certain circumstances. Tesser (1988) proposed 
the self-evaluation maintenance model, which focuses on those processes through which 
people maintain positive self-evaluations when facing a potentially threatening 
comparison situation. According to this model, those individuals who are facing close 
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others that demonstrate excellent performance in an important dimension will face a 
reduced self-evaluation and demonstrate negative reactions. Upward comparison, which is 
especially threatening to self-esteem, may result in negative reactions (Mussweiler, 
Gabriel, & Bodenhausen, 2000; Salovey & Rodin, 1984).   
However, other studies reveal that different reactions are expected when the focal 
person believes that s/he can reach the same excellence of a comparable other. People’s 
perceptions about their ability to cope with a certain situation can distort their appraisals 
over the comparison situation (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984) and alter their reactions toward 
such situation (Major et al., 1991). If one believes that s/he can achieve a better outcome 
or performance compared with another, then the success of others will provide him/her (a) 
a positive signal that s/he can improve himself/herself, (b) relevant information on how 
much s/he can achieve, and (c) a guideline on how to succeed. Therefore, the affective 
responses of individuals in an upward comparison situation depend on how they interpret 
the comparison results. To explain the effects of an individual’s belief in whether or not 
s/he can achieve the same success of the comparison target, several factors have been 
introduced in the literature, including perceived control over comparison discrepancy 
(Major et al., 1991) and attainability (Lockwood & Kunda, 1997).  
Perceived control refers to “the extent to which one believes that subsequent outcomes 
are controllable and alterable” (Testa & Major, 1990, p. 206). Under an esteem-relevant 
upward comparison situation, one’s perception of his/her controllability may alter his/her 
interpretations of the situation by influencing the secondary appraisal process, which 
evaluates and determines his/her reactions to the event (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). For 
example, those situations where personal significance is high but perceived controllability 
is low are threatening to individuals, while those situations where significance and 
perceived controllability are both high tend to be appraised as a challenge (Folkman, 2013). 
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Therefore, perceived controllability reduces the level of self-threat induced from a social 
comparison and leads emotional reactions toward a positive direction. For example, when 
the advantages of a similar other in a self-relevant domain is noticed, controllability 
determines whether the affective reactions to such advantage is negative or positive 
(hostility) and whether the resulting emotion is benign or malicious (benign vs. malicious 
envy) (Hoogland, Thielke, & Smith, 2016). 
When paired with an upward comparison situation in an esteem-relevant domain, a 
high perceived control over one’s ability to change his/her relative standing can increase 
self-efficacy and motivation instead of promoting helplessness or anger (Major et al., 1991, 
p. 247). By contrast, if an individual feels that s/he can do nothing to change his/her 
situation, then s/he may induce feelings of universal helplessness accompanied by affective 
deficits (Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978). Relevant upward comparisons that are 
perceived as unchangeable and attributed to the influence of external agents are especially 
likely to result in anger (Weiner, 1986).  
In implied upward comparison situations, having a low perceived control can lead to 
negative emotional reactions (Bernstein & Crosby, 1980; Crosby, 1976; Nadler & Fisher, 
1986). Crosby (1976) noted that in a relative deprivation situation, perceived control alters 
an individual’s reactions to his/her situation. Under relative deprivation, those individuals 
with a high perceived control and open opportunities tend to focus on the positive aspect 
of their situation and engage in self-improvement. However, for those with low personal 
control, relative deprivation leads to emotional outburst regardless of the availability of 
opportunities (Bernstein & Crosby, 1980; Crosby, 1976). In an implied upward comparison 
situation where other people help the focal person, if the aid recipients expect to have 
control over the subsequent outcome, then a cluster of positive affects is produced in the 
long run. However, the low controllability perceived by the recipient can result in a series 
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of short-term negative affects, which are then followed by a long-term helplessness-like 
dependency (Nadler & Fisher, 1986).  
Stewart et al. (2013) showed that individuals use downward comparison for one’s own 
subjective well-being only when they perceive low controllability. With a high perceived 
control over the situation, these individuals feel less need to protect their subjective well-
being by adopting secondary control strategies, such as downward comparison. Instead, 
they alter their perceptions and positively react to their situation (Stewart et al., 2013).   
Perceived attainability refers to “the possibility of achieving the compared 
performance” (Argo et al., 2006). Similar to studies on perceived controllability, research 
on attainability depicts the positive consequences resulting from high attainability. 
Compared with superstars in a relevant dimension, if the star’s success seems attainable, 
then individuals feel self-enhanced and inspired; otherwise, these individuals feel self-
deflated. For instance, when accounting undergraduates read an article about an accountant 
with outstanding career achievements, those first-year students who perceive such success 
as attainable will feel positive about themselves and look up to the said accountant as a 
role model. By contrast, those fourth-year students who perceive such success as 
unattainable feel demoralized and deflated (Lockwood & Kunda, 1997). Mills et al. (2002) 
argued that by perceiving thinness as something attainable, dieters fantasize about being 
thin and become less upset when exposed to images of thin bodies. When consumers are 
exposed to upward social comparison information, the inclusion of perceived attainability 
creates a condition where consumers feel unthreatened and are less willing to lie in an 
effort to protect themselves (Argo et al., 2006).  
Although studied under different names, both attainability and perceived control 
intend to examine the effects of an individual’s belief that s/he can attain the same success 
achieved by comparable others. In this study, I use the term “perceived attainability” to 
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refer to an employee’s perception that s/he can achieve a certain quality (i.e., creative 
ability) in his/her organizational context. 
2.6.3. Social Comparison Orientation  
“Social comparison is not equally important to everyone”(Van der Zee, Oldersma, 
Buunk, & Bos, 1998, p. 802). Some people tend to compare themselves with others 
frequently and react to the comparison information sensitively, while others are 
uninterested and insensitive to such information. The concept of social comparison 
orientation (SCO) has been introduced in the literature to investigate the dispositional 
differences in the tendency of individuals to engage in social comparison (Gibbons & 
Buunk, 1999; Van der Zee et al., 1998). SCO refers to “the personality disposition of 
individuals who are strongly oriented to social comparison, who are strongly interested in 
their own standing relative to others, and who are interested in information about others’ 
thoughts and behaviors in similar circumstances” (Van der Zee et al., 1998, p. 802).  
In their experiment with cancer patients, Van der Zee et al. (1998) found that when 
provided with a computer program that enables them to access the interview data and 
medical information of other patients who were doing better or worse than themselves, 
certain groups of patients clearly spent more time reading the others’ experiences. 
Although patients with high neuroticism tend to prefer upward information, when they 
have high SCO, they read more interviews regardless of their direction. Patients with high 
SCO tend to engage in and respond to social comparison more frequently compared with 
those with low SCO (Van der Zee et al., 1998).  
Depending on their level of SCO, some people spend more time engaging in 
comparisons, while other people refuse to engage in such activity. Some people sensitively 
notice others’ feelings and thoughts and are therefore greatly affected by them, while others 
are truly disinterested in what others think and feel (Buunk & Gibbons, 2007). Gibbons 
49 
and Buunk (1999) developed a scale to measure this “individual difference variable that is 
defined as the extent to which and the frequency with which people compare themselves 
with others” (Gibbons & Buunk, 1999).  
Those people with high SCO are greatly affected by the results of social comparison. 
For example, when college students learn that drunk driving is common in their population, 
they tend to regard drunk driving as less dangerous and engage in such behavior. However, 
this relationship is significant only among students with high SCO (Gibbons, Lane, 
Gerrard, Pomery, & Lautrup, 2002). In an experiment among individuals who have been 
in relationships for a long time, Buunk et al. (2001) found that the effect of relational 
discontent on satisfaction is moderated by engagement in downward comparison. However, 
such effect was only observed among people with high SCO (Buunk, Oldersma & de Dreu, 
2001).  
Buunk (2005) exposed undergraduate students to two romantic relationship scenarios, 
namely, high commitment and high autonomy scenarios, and expected that male students 
prefer the autonomy scenario and show less negative affect while female students prefer 
the commitment scenario and show less negative affect. Their responses were expected to 
be significant only when these students have high SCO because they need to relate the 
scenario to themselves through the comparison process. As expected, the effects were only 
observed among students with high SCO (Buunk, 2005).  
In the experiment, female participants were exposed to seven pictures of a woman’s 
face with different degrees of attractiveness. The level of attractiveness differentially 
predicted perceived dimensional closeness and psychological closeness. Among the 
participants, those with high SCO perceived dimensional closeness on psychical 
attractiveness (study1) and psychological closeness (study2) more strongly as the 
attractiveness of the target changes (Buunk, Dijkstra, Bosch, Dijkstra, & Barelds, 2012).  
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In Wehrens et al. (2010), SCO strengthened the relationship between social 
comparison and affective responses. Students were asked to complete a questionnaire that 
asked for their affective reactions toward certain comparison situations along with some 
measures of SCO. Among the three types of responses to social comparisons (i.e., empathic, 
constructive, and destructive responses), the male students scored higher on destructive 
responses while the female students scored higher on empathic responses. However, those 
students with high SCO scored higher on all three types of responses compared with those 
students with low SCO (Wehrens et al., 2010). 
These studies clearly show that people with high SCO willingly compare themselves 
with others, experience more feelings and reactions from the comparison, and are highly 
affected by such activity. Given its possible association with various variables related to 
social comparison processes, SCO is a significant potential moderator for social 
comparison research (e.g., Buunk, Van der Zee, & VanYperen, 2001; Wang, Wang, Gaskin, 
& Hawk, 2017). To refine our understanding of how social comparison processes affect 
creativity, SCO will be controlled in this study. 
 
3. Conclusions 
Since the introduction of social comparison theory in 1954, numerous researchers 
have devoted much effort in understanding the causes and results of social comparison. 
However, most of these studies are laboratory studies instead of field studies performed in 
real organizations. Given their dependency on laboratory studies where participants, who 
are mostly undergraduate students, face a clear and concise comparison situation, the 
prevailing stream of literature provides a limited understanding of individuals in complex 
real-world situations, such as workplaces. In organizations, employees are always required 
to deliver a “better” performance compared with others for individual promotion, rewards, 
51 
or organizational success. To survive the competition, individuals are being pressured to 
meet the organizational standards and prove themselves. Given that upward comparison is 
a double-edged sword, understanding how employees construe and respond to a social 
comparison situation is necessary. Without comprehensively understanding this process, 
the prevailing upward comparison in teams may seriously demotivate employees, 
especially the low-performing ones, and eventually lead to organizational failure.  
Given the growing importance of creativity and the lack of thorough recognition of 
the social aspects of individual creativity, an algorithm that explains the effects of social 
comparison on individual creativity must be developed. Such algorithm may provide new 
insights for organizational studies to verify the contingency factors that are found in 
laboratory studies, including relevance and perceived attainability, in field settings. The 
relevance of the comparison dimension is among the most important conditions of 
activated responses toward social comparison. In real-world contexts, employees that 
perform various jobs show different levels of creativity as required by their organizations. 
Therefore, the influence of the different requirements perceived by employees on their 
responses to an upward comparison situation needs to be examined. Perceived attainability 
determines whether an employee construes his/her discrepancy with a superior other as 
either achievable and inspiring or unattainable and demoralizing. The attainability of the 
ability gap in an organization largely depends on the environmental support provided by 
this organization. Therefore, the effect of supervisor support for creativity on employee 
creativity under an upward comparison situation warrants further study.  
Although many theories and research on comparison motives have been conducted, 
the theoretical models that explain how social comparison is related to individual behavior, 
especially creativity, remain scarce (J. P. Gerber et al., 2018). Therefore, a psychological 
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process model that connects social comparison with individual creativity must be 
developed and empirically validated by using field data. 
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CHAPTER 3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
This chapter introduces a process model that connects upward social comparison 
with creative outcomes in organizational settings. Based on the in-depth literature review 
presented in the previous chapter, I propose a conceptual model of social comparison 
process in teams while focusing on the effects of social comparison on creativity through 
affective and cognitive processes. Specifically, I propose that the effect of upward 
comparison on creative ability is related to individual creativity through affective 
reactions, which are presented as an emotion circumplex with valence and activation as 
two axes. I examine the moderating effects of teal-level factors that are expected to 
influence employees’ interpretation of the comparison results. Each quadrant of the 
emotion circumplex, which comprises a combination of valence and activation, is related 
to creativity through the cognitive process including cognitive flexibility, cognitive 
persistence, and cognitive demotivation. Specifically, I propose that depending on the 
type of cognitive state, employees differentially show radical, incremental creativity and 
disengagement from creativity. Figure 8 presents the conceptual framework. 
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Creativity has received much attention among researchers. In contemporary 
organizations that increasingly depend on team-based structure, the interpersonal 
dynamics between team members and the talents of each individual member play 
significant roles in promoting individual creativity. Given the popularity of team systems, 
scholars have begun to examine the importance of social processes in teams in developing 
individual creativity. Consequently, a growing body of research has focused on identifying 
which social dynamics may promote or inhibit creativity. For example, team learning 
behavior (Hirst, Van Knippenberg, & Zhou, 2009) and team bureaucracy (Hirst, Van 
Knippenberg, Chen, & Sacramento, 2011) interactively explain individual creativity along 
with individual goal orientation. Meanwhile, work team climate (Zhu, Gardner, & Chen, 
2018) and work team diversity (Choi, 2007; S. J. Shin, Kim, Lee, & Bian, 2012) predict 
individual creativity. Based on social cognitive theory (Bandura, 1986), Zhou (2003) 
focused on the presence of creative coworkers who serve as role models. Clarifying the 
rather mixed results of previous studies on creative models, Zhou (2003) found that when 
employees perceive their coworkers to be creative, individual creativity is improved in the 
supportive context (i.e., low supervisor close monitoring and high supervisor 
developmental feedback). The positive effect of creative coworkers was especially 
significant among those employees with low creativity. Therefore, in team systems where 
members closely interact with one another, the presence of creative coworkers tends to 
cultivate individual creativity by comparing oneself with superior models.  
Based on previous studies on the social cognitive aspects of team-based organization, 
I consider social comparison among team members as an influential predictor of individual 
creativity. In organizational teams, employees are continuously required to generate 
creative contributions while interacting and competing with their coworkers. This 
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challenging environment forces employees to compare themselves with their coworkers, 
especially team members with whom they closely interact. By comparing their creative 
abilities with those of their coworkers, individuals perceive a discrepancy between them 
and their superior coworkers and try to improve their creativity.  
Studies on social comparison have continually accentuated the importance of upward 
comparison. With regard to the comparison of abilities, Festinger (1954) proposed the 
distinctive feature of “unidirectional drive upward.” Specifically, when people compare 
their abilities with those of others, they tend to choose better-performing others as 
comparison targets to acquire useful information on how to improve themselves because 
they have an innate tendency to improve their performance and become more capable than 
their comparison targets. In organizations where employees are continuously being 
pressured to improve and demonstrate their abilities, individuals tend to engage in upward 
comparison with more creative coworkers with an aim to improve themselves. A recent 
comprehensive meta-analysis of social comparison theory revealed that individuals have a 
strong preference for upward comparison when they do not detect any threat (J. P. Gerber 
et al., 2018). In addition, no evidence can support the claim that these people prefer 
downward comparison when they feel threatened. Therefore, upward social comparison is 
commonly observed in organizations where employees are coalesced as teams to achieve 
an effective performance. Previous studies have examined the positive influence of a 
superior coworker from a slightly different angle, such as role model (Zhou, 2003) and 
mentoring (e.g., coworker mentoring, Eby, 1997; presence of a mentor, Yamada & Tam, 
1996). To address this issue, I highlight how the upward social comparison of the creative 
abilities of team members can develop their individual creativity.  
In this study, I will elaborate the relationship between upward social comparison and 
creativity in various ways. First, to clarify the mechanism that links upward social 
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comparison with individual creativity, I propose a detailed intermediating process. 
Specifically, I identify emotional reactions to social comparison as a mediating process 
toward creativity. Given that social comparison results in diverse affective reactions, these 
diverse emotional reactions are expected to differentially mediate social comparison and 
creativity. In proposing affective reactions as a mediating process, I adopt the emotion 
circumplex view with valence and activation on each axis. Although recent studies in the 
neurophysiology and psychological disciplines have consistently called for a shift from 
discrete emotions to the emotional circumplex (Baas et al., 2008; Posner et al., 2005), 
previous studies still adopt discrete emotion or the positivity of emotions to understand 
emotional reactions. However, the current research practices, which mostly depend on 
discrete emotions, prevent us from achieving a thorough understanding of the emotional 
span. To address these concerns, I adopt the emotion circumplex as a mediating process 
between upward social comparison and creativity.  
Second, I further examine the reactions to upward social comparison by considering 
some boundary conditions with a multilevel perspective. The reaction to social comparison 
is not intrinsic to the direction of comparison but largely depends on contextual factors 
(Buunk, Collins, Taylor, VanYperen, et al., 1990). Depending on the level of relevance and 
attainability, an upward social comparison result can become optimistic information (e.g., 
the focal person can improve himself/herself to be similar to others) or bad news (e.g., the 
focal person is lagging behind compared with others) (Major et al., 1991). Furthermore, 
unlike most existing studies on social comparison that have focused on the individual-level 
variables of relevance and attainability, I propose organizational contextual factors as 
moderators and identify what organizational managers can do to positively improve the 
effects of inevitable upward comparison on employee creativity.  
Third, I further elaborate the basic relationship between emotion circumplex and 
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individual creativity by considering cognitive process as an intervening process that relates 
emotion with creativity. By using dual pathway theory (De Dreu et al., 2008), I propose 
that emotion influences the cognitive tactics that employees adopt to promote creativity. 
In addition to cognitive flexibility and cognitive persistence (De Dreu et al., 2008), I 
propose that the cognitively demotivated state may explain why some people are not 
creative yet cognitively withdraw their interest from creativity.  
Lastly, to enrich the present understanding on individual creativity, I examine the 
cognitive process that lead to creativity by identifying three types of creativity outcomes, 
namely, radical creativity, incremental creativity, and creative disengagement. By 
specifying different cognitive processes that underlie different types of individual 
creativity, I explain the notion that each type of cognitive processes differentially leads to 
individual creativity (De Dreu et al., 2008).   
Theoretically, this study contributes to the organizational literature in several ways. 
First, by applying social comparison theory, I contribute to the creativity literature by 
enriching the present understanding on the social cognitive aspect of creativity in team-
based organizations.  
Second, I offer a detailed understanding of social comparison in relation to creativity 
by providing contextual variables that affect individuals’ reactions to social comparisons. 
To address the limited understanding of social comparison in organizational contexts, I 
propose two organizational variables, namely, creative requirement and resources for 
creativity, as moderating mechanisms that connect upward comparison with individual 
creativity. My work also contributes to social comparison theory by expanding the present 
research scope, which is predominantly limited to individual-level laboratory studies, to 
the organizational context. 
Third, I build an elaborate model by proposing emotional reactions and cognitive 
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process as mediating mechanisms that link upward social comparison with individual 
creativity. By considering emotion and cognition as two important preceding mechanisms 
of creativity (De Dreu et al., 2008), I offer a highly comprehensive and balanced 
perspective for understanding individual creativity. In addition, by integrating emotional 
and cognitive factors, I present a highly comprehensive picture of individual creativity. 
Fourth, by developing a dual pathway model that links emotion with creativity, I create 
a fine-grained model that provides an exhaustive dimensional view of emotion and 
cognition. Specifically, I adopt an emotion circumplex with valence and activation in its 
axes to explain affective reactions and to examine cognitive flexibility, cognitive 
persistence, and cognitively demotivated state as the three aspects of a cognitive process.  
Finally, this research answers the continuous call for the development of a dimensional 
model of emotions in the social comparison and creativity literature, which conveniently 
adopts discrete emotions or the dichotomous approach. By providing an emotion 
circumplex view with valence and activation in its axes, I highlight the importance of 
thoroughly understanding an individual’s emotional reactions to comparison results.   
2. Theoretical Development and Hypotheses 
Organizational teams can serve as hotbeds for individual creativity (S. J. Shin et al., 
2012), and numerous studies have attempted to find how creativity is cultivated in teams. 
Given the increasing focus on creativity as a social process (Perry–Smith, 2006; Perry–
Smith & Shalley, 2003), social relationships with other members in a work community 
have attracted much research attention (e.g., Rouse, 2018). Having more social 
relationships is beneficial for individual creativity as proven by the number of weak ties 
(Perry–Smith & Shalley, 2003). Similarly, enriched social interactions can explain 
individual creativity as proven by previous investigations on the effect of work team 
diversity (Choi, 2007; S. J. Shin et al., 2012) and work team climate (Hirst et al., 2011, 
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2009; Zhu et al., 2018). However, previous studies have neglected how having more 
creative coworkers in the same team can influence individual creativity through social 
comparison (Zhou, 2003). Therefore, in this study, I adopt the social comparison 
perspective to explain the effects of superior team members on individual creativity. 
2.1.  Social Comparison Theory 
Introduced by Festinger (1954), social comparison theory deals with a major source 
of human concern. Social comparison is an “almost inevitable element of social interaction” 
(Brickman & Bulman, 1977, p.150). Social comparison theory provides a lens through 
which interpersonal relationships can be understood (Tesser, 1988). When objective, non-
social means are unavailable, people compare their abilities or opinions with others to 
evaluate themselves (S. E. Taylor et al., 1990). By comparing themselves with salient 
others, people learn more about themselves (Festinger, 1954). With the accumulation of 
studies on this topic, social comparison has become a central topic in diverse research 
domains. 
In the beginning, social comparison studies have focused on the selection of 
comparison targets (J. P. Gerber et al., 2018). Following the similarity hypotheses 
proposed by Festinger (1954), which suggests that people compare themselves with similar 
others who are identified as the best sources of self-evaluation, subsequent studies have 
shifted their focus toward other motivations, such as self-improvement and self-
enhancement, thereby inviting additional research into upward and downward comparison. 
Downward comparison theory (Wills, 1981) shifted the attention of researchers from self-
assessment to self-enhancement. According to this view, downward comparison (i.e., 
comparing an individual with someone worse off than himself/herself) is preferred under 
conditions where threat is present given that such activity generates a positive affect that 
is essential for self-enhancement. By contrast, based on construal theory, Collins (1996) 
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proposed that individuals prefer upward comparisons that make them feel better about 
themselves. Given that people do not want to become worse off than others, Collins (1996) 
argued that downward comparison is unlikely to be preferred by individuals. After a review 
of upward and downward selection studies, recent meta-analysis has revealed that people 
strongly prefer upward comparison when no threat is observed; moreover, study has shown 
that people do not prefer downward comparison even when facing threats (J. P. Gerber et 
al., 2018). Specifically, when abilities are concerned, individuals tend to compare 
themselves with superior others because an upward comparison can provide these 
individuals with better information and chances to improve themselves (Festinger, 1954). 
In organizations, financial (e.g., basic salary and performance incentives) and non-
financial rewards (e.g., promotion, recognition, and additional responsibility) are 
determined by comparing one’s abilities with his/her coworkers. Accordingly, employees 
focus on better-performing others as comparison targets and seek to improve themselves 
to become as good as or better than these targets. Therefore, to examine organizational 
behaviors, I specifically focus on upward social comparison.  
Another issue faced in social comparison research relates to the reactions of 
individuals to social comparison. Upward social comparison may be perceived as a double-
edged sword. On the one hand, upward comparison may signal that one is not doing as 
well as the others. On the other hand, learning that someone is performing much better 
highlights a room for improvement. Those people who focus on the bright side may feel 
positively as a result of the comparison, but if one focuses on the negative side of the 
upward comparison, s/he may end up feeling worse about himself/herself. The affective 
reaction to upward comparison is moderated by various factors (Buunk, Collins, Taylor, 
VanYperen, et al., 1990), and numerous studies have attempted to figure out the potential 
moderators.  
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Based on the transactional model of stress (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984) and the 
findings of previous studies (e.g., Nadler & Fisher, 1986; Tesser, 1988; Testa & Major, 
1990; Wood, 1989), Major et al. (1991) proposed esteem-relevance and perceived control 
as two key determinants of the consequences of social comparison. Subsequent studies 
have empirically proved that the relevance of the dimension being evaluated (e.g. Franzoi 
& Klaiber, 2007) and perceived attainability/control (e.g. Lockwood & Kunda, 1997; 
Stewart et al., 2013) are key concerns related to the consequences of social comparison.   
Despite the accumulating body of research on social comparison that endeavors to 
identify those factors that influence how one construes the comparison results, some 
serious chasms prevent us from comprehensively understanding individual reactions to 
social comparison. First, previous studies usually manipulate a social comparison situation 
such as the direction of comparison, high or low relevance, and levels of attainability, in 
experimental settings, and often use undergraduate students as their samples. Second, the 
contingency variables for the effects of social comparison are only examined at the 
individual level. The prevailing focus on the individual aspects of moderating variables 
(i.e., relevance and controllability) may effectively explain the reactions to the social 
comparisons of personal dimensions, such as dating and marital relationships (Morry & 
Sucharyna, 2016, 2018), body image (Franzoi & Klaiber, 2007; Veldhuis, Konijn, & 
Knobloch–Westerwick, 2017), or experimental task performance in laboratory studies 
(Tesser & Collins, 1988; Tesser et al., 1988). However, this is obviously not the case for 
examining employee reactions to upward comparison in actual organizations.  
In organizations, whether the comparison domain, such as creative ability, is important 
to self or not is not solely determined by one’s self-definition and interests but is 
determined by the organizational requirements. For instance, in the movie Modern Times, 
although Charlie Chaplin enjoy singing and regard music as relevant to his self-esteem, 
62 
quickly tightening bolts on a moving conveyor belt remains a relevant ability for him 
regardless of his personal interests. In the organizational context, irrespective of one’s 
interest or self-definition, the relevance of the comparison domain will be determined by 
the job definition proposed by the organization.  
Moreover, the perceived attainability of the comparison target’s success in an 
organization largely depends on the resources and support provided by the organization. 
In the case of Modern Times, if Charlie Chaplin wants to improve his ability in rapidly 
tightening bolts, then the resources provided by his organization, such as good-quality 
wrenches or informative feedback and know-hows from his supervisor, are crucial. Despite 
the large number of studies on affective reactions to social comparisons, the reactions to 
upward comparisons in organizational situations have been rarely examined. Therefore, I 
propose some organizational contingencies that determine the reactions of employees to 
upward social comparison.  
2.2.  Organizational Context for Creativity: Creative Requirement 
The importance of creative ability for employees is determined by the extent to which 
s/he is expected to generate creative ideas for his/her organization. Creative requirement 
stands for “the perception that one is expected, or needs, to generate work-related ideas” 
(Unsworth, Wall, & Carter, 2005, p. 542) and is viewed as an important predictor of 
employee creativity. If the job requires creativity as a significant component of employee 
performance, then employees will consider creativity as an important and relevant aspect 
of their successful performance and therefore adopt new approaches and create genuine 
ideas while accomplishing their job tasks (Kim, Hon, & Lee, 2010). Specifically, for those 
employees who engage in an upward comparison in terms of creative ability, the perception 
that creativity is highly required in the organization indicates that these employees need to 
recuperate. Moreover, given that creativity involves taking risks, organizations that create 
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the perception that creativity is valued and required may reduce the potential risks 
associated with creativity and encourage their employees to seek creativity. Therefore, 
creative requirement is an important contextual factor that helps employees who are facing 
an upward comparison engage in creativity.  
2.3. Organizational Context for Creativity: Resource for Creativity 
Creativity entails a high degree of mental activities and risk-taking experiences. To be 
creative, several resources, including time, physical assets, and psychological energy, are 
indispensable. Researchers have shown that having a sufficient amount of creative 
resources is related to achieving a creative performance (Amabile et al., 1996; C. Chen, 
Shih, & Yeh, 2011; Damanpour, 1991). Therefore, the availability of resources or support 
for creativity can be viewed as an important factor that induces employee’s creativity.  
The resources for creativity include everything that an organization can provide its 
employees to explore unusual perspectives, develop creative ideas, and foster new ideas 
(Amabile et al., 1996; C. Chen et al., 2011; Shalley & Gilson, 2004). Employees must have 
access to sufficient resources, such as time, facilities, financial support, and training, in 
order to be creative. For instance, slack resources provide a buffer to absorb failure and 
encourage employees to take more risks (Damanpour, 1991; Rosner, 1968). Having an 
adequate time limit allows the exploration of new ideas and creates a reasonable amount 
of tension to stimulate creative solutions (Amabile, 1998). Sufficient financial support 
reduces the possibility for employees to spend creative efforts in searching for financial 
resources (Amabile, 1998). The availability of training, education, and knowledge forms 
the basis for fostering novel ideas. Therefore, employees are expected to generate more 
novel ideas and improve their creative performances when they are provided with a 
sufficient amount of resources (C. Chen et al., 2011). Specifically, employees under an 
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upward comparison situation tend to believe that they can achieve a creative performance 
similar to others if they are given a sufficient amount of resources to develop their 
creativity. The creative resources provided by the team tend to increase their employees’ 
perceived attainability of a superior performance and encourage them to engage in creative 
behaviors. Therefore, I hypothesize the following: 
Hypothesis 1a. Upward social comparison will interact with creative requirement and 
resources for creativity to affect individual creativity that upward social comparison is 
positively related to employee creativity when creative requirement is high  
Hypothesis 1b. Upward social comparison will interact with creative requirement and 
resources for creativity to affect individual creativity that upward social comparison is 
positively related to employee creativity when resources for creativity is high. 
2.4.  Intervening Process: Emotional Reaction to Upward Social Comparison  
To fully understand how social comparison affects creativity, I propose affective 
reaction to upward social comparison as an underlying psychological process that explains 
the relationship between social comparison and creativity. Emotion represents a complex 
mental state that involves neural and physiological changes resulting from an internal or 
external stimulus event that is relevant to the major concerns of the focal person (Scherer, 
2005). Previous studies show that the affective reactions to social comparison play 
important roles in forming individual behavior (Buunk, Collins, Taylor, VanYperen, et al., 
1990; Richard H. Smith, 2000; Wehrens et al., 2010; Wood, 1989), and a growing number 
of research have focused on the role of affective reactions resulting from social comparison 
in characterizing individual behavior and revealed that emotional arousal can promote the 
activation and exertion of energy in a goal-directed behavior (Diefendorff & Chandler, 
2010; Rahimi, Hall, Wang, & Maymon, 2017; Zheng, Baskin, & Peng, 2018). For example, 
negative emotional reactions to social comparison may lead to frustration and 
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demotivation to achieve the desired end states (Diefendorff & Chandler, 2010), whereas 
envy mediates the effect of incidental social comparison on consumers’ materialism and 
their subsequent spending behavior (Zheng et al., 2018). Despite the importance of 
emotion in stimulating creativity (Amabile, Barsade, Mueller, & Staw, 2005; Baas et al., 
2008), virtually no research has examined this subject. Accordingly, I propose that the 
upward social comparison of creative ability influences the creativity of an individual 
through affective reactions. 
Although social comparison studies have initially focused on the direction of 
comparison, contemporary researchers have shifted their attention to the consequences of 
comparison results (J. P. Gerber et al., 2018). Affective reactions have received much 
research attention. Smith (2000) specified 15 affective reactions to social comparison that 
depend on the comparison direction, the desirability of the results, the focus of attention, 
and the contrastive versus assimilative nature of the reaction. Similarly, Buunk et al. (2005) 
identified eight types of affective reactions that depend on the comparison direction, the 
contrast versus identification nature of reaction, and the focus of attention (Buunk, Kuyper, 
et al., 2005). Although these two studies agree on some affective reactions (e.g., resentment, 
worry, and contempt), the emotional spheres they cover show substantial differences for 
the other emotional reactions (Buunk, Kuyper, et al., 2005). 
In this case, the prevailing dependency of extant research on discrete emotions poses 
some serious disadvantages. First, assigning different labels to each discrete emotion may 
hamper the continuance of research because doing so may make the findings of studies 
difficult or impossible to compare (Baas et al., 2008). Second, labeling discrete emotions 
can create some problems given the different levels of familiarity of the respondents with 
specific emotional terms and their subsequent conscious interpretations of what people 
already know about emotion words (Eerola & Vuoskoski, 2011). Third, individuals 
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experiencing mixed feelings may be misled to a “selected” discrete emotion instead of 
correctly reporting the emotions they are experiencing (Eerola & Vuoskoski, 2011). 
Certain response formats may also cause problems such that the provided extensive word 
list may engender confusion and order effects and that selecting certain emotion words 
may expose the research aim (Scherer, Shuman, Fontaine, & Soriano, 2013). 
Recent studies across many disciplines, including neurophysiology, music psychology, 
and social and organizational psychology, identify the dimensional model as the best 
approach for exploring emotional states (Baas et al., 2008; Posner et al., 2005). In their 
meta-analysis of mood–creativity studies, Baas et al. (2008) found that emotions can best 
be described by the 2D model (Baas et al., 2008). A growing body of research in 
neurophysiology reveals that affective reactions can best be understood by using a 
dimensional model with hedonic tone and activation in its two axes (Barrett, 1998; Eerola 
& Vuoskoski, 2011; A. J. Gerber et al., 2008; Posner et al., 2005). A music psychology 
study that compares the discrete and dimensional models of emotions also identify the 2D 
model as the best tool for understanding affective reactions (Eerola & Vuoskoski, 2011).   
In sum, to address the limitations in relation to the use of discrete emotions and to 
answer the call for further research on a wider array of emotional reactions (Baas et al., 
2008), the 2D model with two axes is considered the optimal tool for exploring basic 
emotions (Eerola & Vuoskoski, 2011; Gu et al., 2018). Therefore, to comprehensively 
understand emotional reactions to social comparison, I propose an emotion circumplex 
with the axes of valence and activation as intermediating processes between upward 
comparison and individual creativity.  
As previously discussed, employee reactions to social comparison depends not on the 
comparison direction but on the contextual contingencies. While upward comparison may 
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deliver both positive and negative signs on one’s status, the affective reactions to this 
comparison depend on how one construes the information obtained from the comparison. 
By using the transactional model of stress (Lazarus & Folkman 1984), Major et al. (1991) 
proposed that an individual’s response to a stressful situation differs depending on his/her 
appraisal of a comparison. Specifically, the relevance of the social comparison domain 
influences the primary appraisal of the comparison situation as either threatening or not. 
An upward comparison in a highly relevant comparison domain can threaten one’s esteem, 
thereby leading to the activated state of emotions (Oei et al., 2012). In organizations, those 
employees who perceive that their job requires a high amount of creativity will also 
perceive the importance of being creative personnel in their organization. Given that an 
upward comparison indicates that an employee is lagging behind in a dimension that is 
considered important in his/her organization, s/he will feel threatened and emotionally 
activated. By contrast, having a low creative requirement suggests that an upward 
comparison situation is a benign-positive experience for the focal employee. In this case, 
this employee has no reason to be aroused, thereby resulting in his/her deactivated 
emotional state.  
Although the relevance of the comparison domain clearly leads to bifurcated reactions, 
empirical studies reveal that individuals in relevant upward comparison situations show 
different reactions depending on whether they believe that they can achieve the same level 
of excellence demonstrated by a comparable other. Self-threat from relevant upward 
comparison with a high perceived control induces instrumental behaviors and positive 
affect, while the same threatening situation with a lack of control can lead to a negative 
affect (Nadler & Fisher, 1986). For instance, when facing an accountant with outstanding 
career achievements, undergraduate students majoring in accounting are differentially 
influenced by this superstar depending on their expected attainability (Lockwood & Kunda, 
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1997). First-year students who think they can become as successful as the comparison 
target (high perceived attainability) positively responded to the superstar (upward 
comparison), while fourth-year students, for whom it seems too late to achieve a similar 
level of success (low perceived attainability), negatively responded. Accordingly, the 
belief that one can possibly obtain the same achievements as the comparison target and 
thereby reduce the discrepancy between him/her and the target determines whether or not 
this focal person will positively respond to upward comparison. In organizations, creative 
resources provided by leaders and the organization will encourage employees to construe 
the upward comparison situation as an informational indicator that they can improve 
themselves to be similar to their superior team members, thereby promoting hopeful, 
positive affectivity (Amabile, Schatzel, Moneta, & Kramer, 2004).  
Therefore, if employees who are facing upward social comparison situation also 
perceive that their jobs require a high level of creativity, their emotional activation level 
will be increased. If employees under upward social comparison situation find out that they 
are provided with generous resources for creativity, their emotional reactions will be 
positive. Thus, the following relationships are hypothesized: 
Hypothesis 2a. Creative requirement moderates the relationship between upward 
social comparison and emotional activation in such a way that emotion will be activated 
when creative requirement is high. 
Hypothesis 2b. Resources for creativity moderates the relationship between upward 
social comparison and emotional valence in such a way that emotional reaction will be 
positive when resources for creativity is high. 
2.5.  Intervening Process: Cognitive Process 
Affective reactions to upward comparison can induce cognitive processes. The 
affective influence on individual cognition has been validated in previous studies (e.g., 
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affect-infusion model, Forgas, 1995; broaden and build theory, Fredrickson, 2001; 
feelings-as-information theory, Schwarz, 2012). Activation is related to the release of 
dopamine and noradrenaline, which boost the performance of working memory (Kimberg, 
D’Esposito, & Farah, 1997) and influence one’s novelty-seeking behavior and creative 
drive (Flaherty, 2005). Emotionally activated individuals, compared to deactivated people, 
thus tend to have more energy to exert in searching information and integrate it. When 
emotionally activated, individuals have more capacity to solve complex problems and 
consider multiple alternatives (Baas, De Dreu, & Nijstad, 2011; De Dreu et al., 2008). 
Some researchers argue that the intensity of affect determines one’s cognitive task 
performance (Easterbrook, 1959; George & Zhou, 2007; Larsen & Diener, 1987). 
Meanwhile, a low level of activation is related to inactivity and avoidance, which results 
in neglect of information and low cognitive performance (Baas et al., 2008).  
Another component of emotion, valence, is also differentially related to the cognitive 
process. Positive affect expands the repertoires of thought and action (Fredrickson, 2001), 
whereas negative mood narrows down an individual’s thought–action repertoire. Positive 
emotions also broaden individuals’ receptivity to new information and allow them to utilize 
more general knowledge when performing tasks (Bless et al., 1996; Fredrickson, 2001). 
Given that a positive state enhances brain activation, those individuals with positive 
emotions tend to rely on global concepts drawn from memory and are more able to 
associate distance concepts compared with those who feel negative emotions (Bolte, 
Goschke, & Kuhl, 2003). By contrast, negative emotions tend to rely on local information 
and process information from external stimuli instead of memory (Gasper & Clore, 2002; 
Kuhbandner et al., 2009). In sum, positive emotion broadens one’s focus of attention, 
thereby encouraging a highly inclusive, flexible, and unusual thinking (Amabile et al., 
2005; Fredrickson & Branigan, 2005), whereas negative emotions are related to narrowed 
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focus of attention, systematic generation and processing of information, and increased 
investment of efforts (Baas et al., 2008).  
Taken together, those individuals with activated positive emotion are filled with 
energy and have an increased attention span to search for information. These individuals 
benefit from their high receptivity to new information and their increased energy to search 
and integrate the information such that they can associate distant, new information from 
different categories. With loose, heuristic attention, those individuals who feel activated 
positive emotion can generate and process unusual and flexible ideas in novel categories. 
Therefore, activated positive emotion is related to cognitive flexibility.  
By contrast, activated negative emotion narrows one’s focus of attention, lowers 
his/her cognitive flexibility, and reduces his/her ability to shift attention. Therefore, this 
type of emotion narrows down viable cognitive categories (Mikulincer, Florian, & Tolmacz, 
1990), and those individuals who feel such emotion tend to rely on extant thought–action 
repertoires when processing concrete external information and stick to given categories. 
With activated energy, individuals dedicate more effort in integrating and processing 
information in systematic and analytical ways yet tend to adhere to given categories 
because of their reduced attentional focus. Therefore, activated negative emotion is related 
to cognitive persistence. 
Individuals with a deactivated emotion demonstrate low energy in their search and 
integration of information. Having a low level of activation will also under-stimulate 
individuals and reduce their energy (Gardner, 1986), thereby resulting in inactivity and 
avoidance. Although emotional valence can inspire people to adopt certain cognitive 
strategies, given the low energy level of these people, they become cognitively 
demotivated and draw their attention away from cognitive processes. Although 
emotionally deactivated individuals do not completely disengage themselves from the 
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cognitive process, they are cognitively demotivated. Given that this demotivated state has 
been largely ignored in previous studies, I propose cognitive demotivation as a third 
cognitive state.  
Hypothesis 3a. Activated positive emotion is positively related to cognitive flexibility. 
Hypothesis 3b. Activated negative emotion is positively related to cognitive persistence. 
Hypothesis 3c. Deactivated positive and negative emotions are positively related to 
cognitive demotivation.  
Building on the above discussion, I propose that affective reactions have an 
intermediating role in the relationship between upward social comparison and cognitive 
process. Those individuals who perceive that their coworkers are excelling in terms of 
creative ability will be cognitively activated to respond to this upward comparison situation. 
Based on their perceptions toward their organizational contexts in which creativity is 
required and resources for creativity are provided, employees will first affectively respond 
to their situation. Their affective reaction, in turn, will be related to their cognitive reactions. 
Previous studies on the affective influence on the content and process of cognition also 
reveal that affect determines an individual’s reactions to social stimulation (Forgas, 1992, 
2017). Upward social comparison is construed based on one’s organizational context to 
engender the employees’ affective reactions, which in turn influence their cognitive 
processes (Forgas, 2017). Therefore, I propose that the relationship of cognitive reactions 
with the interaction between upward social comparison and organizational context for 
creativity is mediated by affective reactions. 
Hypothesis 4a. The upward social comparison of creative ability is positively related 
to cognitive flexibility through activated positive emotion.  
Hypothesis 4b. The upward social comparison of creative ability is positively related 
to cognitive persistence through activated negative emotion.  
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Hypothesis 4c. The upward social comparison of creative ability is positively related 
to cognitive demotivation through deactivated positive emotion.  
Hypothesis 4d. The upward social comparison of creative ability is positively related 
to cognitive demotivation through deactivated negative emotion.  
2.6.   Radical Creativity, Incremental Creativity, and Creative Disengagement 
I posit that the affective reactions to upward social comparison, which are based on 
one’s perceptions toward his/her organizational context for creativity (including creative 
requirement and creativity resources), are related to individual creativity through the 
cognitive process. To elaborate the role of different cognitive pathways to different types 
of creativity, I adopt radical creativity and incremental creativity as two types of creativity 
that are prevalent in organizations and examine them along with creative disengagement, 
which refers to the propensity for individuals to intentionally withdraw their cognitive 
resources from creativity.  
Creativity refers to the production of novel and useful ideas (Amabile, 1983). 
Although the “essence of creativity cannot be captured in a single variable” (Sternberg, 
1999, p. 84), most studies have examined creativity as a unitary construct, thereby limiting 
their understanding of the process and factors that underlie such phenomenon. By focusing 
on a different magnitude of change, Mumford and Gustafson (1988) suggested that creative 
ideas range from minor adaptations to radical breakthroughs. They added that the 
psychological processes that underlie different creative contributions may also vary. As the 
research interest toward this topic continues to grow, different types of creativity have 
emerged from the literature. For example, Sternberg (1999) proposed seven types of 
creativity contributions that depend on the amount and types of creativity displayed. A 
matrix of four creativity types was proposed by taking into account the problem type and 
the drivers of engagement (Unsworth, 2001). Meanwhile, Kaufman and Beghetto (2009) 
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developed a four C model (i.e., big-C, little-c, mini-c, and pro-c) that distinguishes four 
types of creativity to account for the intrapersonal and professional aspects of this 
phenomenon (Kaufman & Beghetto, 2009).  
Alternatively, Gilson and Madjar (2011) proposed radical creativity and incremental 
creativity, which focus on novelty and usefulness, respectively. Radical creativity refers to 
set-breaking ideas that change the existing practices and alternatives into a substantially 
different framework (Gilson & Madjar, 2011), whereas incremental creativity refers to 
modifying the existing practices and products and is more focused on usefulness than on 
novelty. Given that minor adaptations to existing products and services are required for the 
survival and continuance of an organization and that a paradigm-shifting creativity, such 
as the development of smartphones, is crucial for an organization to achieve prosperity, 
both radical creativity and incremental creativity must be nurtured by organizations to 
achieve success in a highly competitive environment. Previous studies suggest that those 
factors and processes that may influence different types of creativity must be clarified to 
profoundly understand creativity (e.g. Madjar, Greenberg, & Chen, 2011). These studies 
also reveal that different factors and processes can lead to different levels of engagement 
in creativity. Radical creativity is more strongly predicted by intrinsic motivation than by 
extrinsic motivation, is related to problem-driven ideas and ideas generated in abstract 
theory, and associated with certain factors, including willingness to take risks, resources 
for creativity, and career commitment. Meanwhile, incremental creativity is well explained 
by extrinsic motivation, the ideation for finding a solution to an already-defined problem, 
ideas based on concrete practices, and certain factors, including the presence of creative 
coworkers as role models and organizational identification (Gilson & Madjar, 2011; 
Madjar et al., 2011). Creative self-efficacy partially encourages employees to search for 
ideas outside their organizational boundaries, thereby resulting in a high level of radical 
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creativity (Jaussi & Randel, 2014). Intrinsic and extrinsic motivational orientations 
influence creativity through personal creativity goal, and the indirect influences show a 
positive linear relationship for incremental creativity and an inverted U-shaped 
relationship for radical creativity (Gong, Wu, Song, & Zhang, 2017). Following these 
studies, different work processes and antecedents clearly promote or hinder incremental 
and radical creativity.  
However, these studies have only focused on individual-level factors and processes, 
while team compositions and processes may also significantly influence the sense-making 
processes and the creativity outcomes of employees (Gong et al., 2017). Radical creativity, 
compared with incremental creativity, is risk-taking in nature and entails more set-breaking 
ideas that may provoke substantial changes to how people perform their work in an 
organization (Gilson et al., 2012). Therefore, the social relationships within an 
organization or within a team where members directly interact with one another can 
substantially influence either incremental or radical creativity through different emotional 
and cognitive sense-making processes. To this end, I posit that the different cognitive 
processes induced from upward social comparison are related to different types of 
creativity.  
Effectively facilitating employee creativity entails not only the exploitation of avid 
creators but also the fostering of unenthusiastic employees. The few studies that investigate 
the factors and processes of different creativity engagement levels have largely ignored 
those employees who gave up on creativity or decided to withdraw their attention and 
effort from creativity. To examine the differential influences of social and personal factors 
on various levels of creativity, Madjar et al. (2011) compared radical creativity, incremental 
creativity, and routine performance (Madjar et al., 2011). However, routine performance is 
a dimension separate from creativity and refers to neither a low level of creativity nor a 
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performance endowed with both radical and incremental creativity. I attempt to compare 
different levels of employee engagement in creativity to achieve a fair comparison within 
the creative performance domain. By investigating radical creativity and incremental 
creativity along with creative disengagement, I attempt to highlight the pure dynamism of 
creativity domain.  
According to the dual pathway model, cognitive flexibility is characterized by “the 
use of many, broad, and inclusive cognitive categories” (De Dreu et al., 2008, p.740). 
Individuals with a cognitive flexibility have a lower threshold for ideas to be accepted in 
working memory; therefore, these people may take seemingly irrelevant and poor thoughts 
into consideration (Nijstad et al., 2010). Broad and inclusive cognitive categories 
combined with a generous and wide variety of thoughts can create remote and unique 
associations that substantially differ from existing practices and alternatives (Gilson & 
Madjar, 2011).  
Radical creativity requires flexibly discovering, experimenting, and playing with ideas 
to develop a set-breaking framework (Gilson & Madjar, 2011). Radical creativity refers to 
ideas and practices that substantially differ from the extant practices and alternatives. 
Therefore, radical creativity can be achieved from ideation based on paradigms that 
completely differ from the existing frameworks, which is possible through cognitive 
flexibility. The flexibility pathway establishes remote associations that are crucial for 
radical creativity through the broad inclusion of different categories and flexible switching 
among different categories. Therefore, flexibility pathway is related to radical creativity. 
Hypothesis 5a. Cognitive flexibility is positively related to radical creativity.  
Cognitive persistence is distinguishable as it entails a systematic and effortful search 
for new possibilities in few cognitive categories. Those individuals with cognitive 
persistence have a high threshold for ideas to enter their working memory, thereby 
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blocking out irrelevant and distracting thoughts in advance (Nijstad et al., 2010). When 
thoughts from remote categories are not available in their working memory, individuals 
tend to search for ideas in categories within their reach. After a hard work of generating 
obvious and readily available thoughts, cognitively persistent individuals acquire original 
ideas in the end. Besides, according to associative theory, creative ideas are gained from 
remote associations, which require ‘time’ (Mednick, 1962; Runco & Chand, 1995). 
Persistent cognitive efforts may first generate some obvious ideas, but after spending time 
with continued thoughts, people with cognitive persistence come up with original 
associates. 
Incremental creativity is adaptive in nature and focuses on the modification of 
products and processes that are existing in an organization (Gilson & Madjar, 2011). 
Finding new applications and refinements to existing work processes requires an in-depth 
investigation of the current procedures and products. Cognitive persistence facilitates a 
systematic investigation of the problem space with prolonged effort, thereby providing a 
sufficient space for the development of ideas until obvious solutions are examined and 
discarded and original insights are generated (Nijstad et al., 2010). Cognitively persistent 
employees also spend more time and effort in their assigned tasks, which is known to 
facilitate productivity and innovation to some extent (Ko & Choi, 2019). Therefore, I 
hypothesize the following:  
Hypothesis 5b. Cognitive persistence is positively related to incremental creativity. 
Cognitive motivation is widely accepted as an important prerequisite of creativity (M. 
A. Collins & Amabile, 1999). Given that motivation is central to productivity and creativity, 
cognitively demotivated people lack enough energy to deliver focal behavior (Ryan & Deci, 
2000). When cognitively demotivated, employees may withdraw their creative efforts and 
disengage from creativity. These cognitively demotivated employees are expected to 
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reduce their cognitive resources to invest in a creative performance. Regardless of their 
performance in routine tasks, cognitively demotivated employees may avoid opportunities 
to make novel suggestions. These people would try to reduce the saliency of their disparity 
with others and stick to conventional way of solving problems (H. J. Klein, 1989). Given 
that creativity entails an investment of innate mental resources, cognitively demotivated 
individuals who withdraw their cognitive resources are disengaged from creative behaviors.  
Hypothesis 5c. Cognitive demotivation is positively related to creative disengagement. 
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CHAPTER 4. EMPIRICAL STUDY 
1. Sample and Data Collection Procedure 
I collected field data by distributing questionnaires to empirically test the research 
framework. Participants were team members and leaders in Korean organizations that 
adopt teams as major working systems. I collected two waves of data with an interval of 
four weeks to examine the hypothesized causal relationships thoroughly and to reduce the 
potential common method bias (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003). Data 
were collected from 18 organizations in diverse industries, including IT/programming, 
manufacturing, and financial services, to achieve superior external validity of the study 
result. Participants received a $5 gift card for completing each questionnaire. 
Initially, I distributed the survey twice to the participants with an interval of four weeks. 
At the first wave, questionnaires were distributed to 500 individuals and their leaders. A 
total of 420 members in 96 teams accomplished the survey (84% response rate). After a 
four-week interval, questionnaires were again distributed, and 398 members from 93 teams 
returned their envelopes (79.6% response rate). After removing partial data by using full 
information maximum likelihood method, responses of 306 members from 80 teams were 
used for analyses by Mplus 8.3. Each member answered all preceding variables prior to 
creativity. For perceptions toward upward social comparison, employees evaluated their 
team members’ creative ability relative to their own. Although the hypotheses focus on 
team level moderators, I collected individual perceptions of relevance and attainability for 
rigorous examination of moderation effect in both levels. They also answered for their 
perceived attainability of the comparison gap, perceived relevance for creativity, creative 
requirement of their jobs, and creative resources supported by their teams. Creative 
requirement and resources for creativity were aggregated to the group level by calculating 
the mean value of each team to examine organizational context for creativity. I justified 
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their empirical appropriateness of aggregation using rwg as a measure of within-group 
agreement (James, Demaree, & Wolf, 1984) and ICC(1) and ICC(2) as intraclass 
correlation coefficient (Bliese, 2000; G. Chen, Bliese, & Mathieu, 2005). Team members 
also answered for emotions they feel when engaged in creative problem solving with their 
teammates (i.e., activated positive, activated negative, deactivated positive, and 
deactivated negative) and their cognitive states (i.e., cognitive flexibility, cognitive 
persistence, and cognitive demotivation). For the control variables, I asked members for 
social comparison orientation and all participants for demographic variables. At the end of 
the questionnaire, all participants were required to provide a part of their phone number 
(4-digit numbers in the middle of the 11-digit phone number).  
Affective reactions, cognitive attitudes, and creative outcomes were assessed to 
eliminate potential causality issues, using data from the second-wave survey, which were 
collected after a month delay (Cole & Maxwell, 2003). I asked team leaders to rate radical 
creativity, incremental creativity, and creative disengagement of their subordinates and to 
provide team-related information to overcome single-source bias (Avolio, Yammarino, & 
Bass, 1991; Podsakoff & Organ, 1986). When evaluating subordinates’ creative outcomes, 
team leaders were asked to write each member’s age and four-digit phone number to match 
the evaluation result with members’ answers correctly. The part of participants’ phone 
number was used to distinguish individuals and match surveys because it seldom overlaps 
but ensures anonymity. Each questionnaire was distributed in an envelope stating that it 
should be sealed after the response. Supervisors were asked to collect the sealed 
questionnaires from team members and seal them in a team envelope. 
 The final sample (n=306) included 183 female (59.8%) and 123 male (40.2%) 
employees with an average age of 33.2 years (SD=5.6). Participants had an average team 
tenure of 25.1 months (SD=26.7), an average company tenure of 36.7 months (SD=35.4), 
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and an average total tenure of 88.1 months (SD=57.0). The sample of employees consisted 
of 127 staff (41.5%), 88 assistant managers (28.8%), 63 managers (20.6%), and 28 
assistant general managers or those at a higher rank (9.2%). In the analysis sample, 22 held 
a high school degree (7.2%), 49 held a community college degree (16%), 207 held a 
bachelor’s degree (67.6%), and 28 held a master’s or higher degree (9.2%). Data were 
collected from diverse industries, such as IT/programming (22.9%; e.g., mobile gaming 
company), manufacturing (20.9%; e.g., clothing company), service industries (19.6%; e.g., 
advertising agency), finance (10.1%; e.g., community financial services association), and 
others (26.5%; e.g., social contribution foundation).  
2. Ethical	Considerations 
All ethical guidelines related to human participants were applied. The questionnaire 
and procedures were reviewed and approved by the Institutional Review Boards (IRBs). 
According to IRB’s guidelines, I provided potential participants with a separate sheet of 
information about the purpose of the study. Participants were also assured that participation 
in the study is completely voluntary, and individual information would strictly remain 
confidential. Team leaders were informed that teams and organizations participating in the 
study will remain anonymous in subsequent publication of the results. Finally, I informed 
participants that all records will be accessible only to the researcher, and any private 
information will be destroyed as soon as the data from different sources were matched for 
analysis.  
3. Measurement 
I developed all variables originally in English, translated them to Korean, and asked 
multiple specialists to back-translate them to ensure semantic equivalence (Brislin, 1980). 
I used multi-item measures with acceptable internal consistency reliability to asses all 
variables. The items were measured on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly 
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disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).  
Social comparison of creative ability. I constructed a six-item measure for the 
comparison of perceived creative ability between self and coworkers by adopting the 
creative ability measure of Choi, Anderson, and Veillette (2009), who in turn adopted 
several items from Amabile (1988) and Choi (2004). I measured the direct assessment of 
upward comparison of creative ability using six items with the following referent: “my 
team members are better than me at…” (a) “intuitive thinking,” (b) “using their 
imagination,” (c) “generating new ideas,” (d) “presenting creative solutions to a given 
problem,” (e) “general creativity,” and (f) “making creative performance” (α=.93). 
Creative requirement. I used the four-item measure of Choi, Anderson, and Veillette 
(2009) that adopted several items from Unsworth et al. (2005) (α=.91, ICC[1]=45. 
ICC[2]=.75, rwg=.84) to measure creative requirement. The items in this scale included (a) 
“my job often requires me to be creative,” (b) “my job requires me to present creative ideas 
for a given problem,” (c) “my job requires me to generate new ideas,” and (d) “my job 
requires me to offer alternative explanations for a given phenomenon.” 
Resources for creativity. I constructed a four-item measure to determine the extent to 
which employees perceive that they are being provided by their team with the necessary 
resources to engage in creativity (α=.82, ICC[1]=.45, ICC[2]=.78, rwg=.83). I adopted 
resources for creativity items from Madjar, Greenberg, and Chen (2011) to reflect four 
important dimensions of resources: material, time, fund, and general resources (C. Chen et 
al., 2011; Rosello & Tran, 2011). Sample items included (a) “the available resources in this 
team allow me to explore new ideas,” (b) “I can easily get the materials I need to develop 
new ideas and practices,” (c) “I have sufficient time to engage in creative activities during 
my working hours,” and (d) “I have sufficient funds to develop new ideas and practices.” 
Relevance of creativity. I used a three-item measure based on the self-relevance 
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measure of Tsai, Yang, and Cheng (2014) to assess employees’ perceived relevance of 
creativity (α=.86). The three items were (a) “being creative is very important to me,” (b) 
“being creative is related to my ‘self,’” and (c) “being creative is connected to my future 
in the organization.” 
Perceived attainability. I constructed four items for measuring perceived attainability 
of creative ability (α=.85) by adopting the attainability items of Lockwood and Kunda 
(1997). The items included (a) “my creativity is changeable in this team;” (b) “if I work at 
it, I can improve my creativity in this team;” (c) “my creative ability changes according to 
my working environment;” and (d) “I can enhance my creativity if necessary.” 
Affective reactions. I used the job-related affect measure (Warr, Bindl, Parker, & 
Inceoglu, 2014) to identify 13 emotions that fully fit each quadrant of the emotion 
circumplex. I asked the participants to indicate to what extent they feel certain emotions 
when working on creative tasks in their team with their coworkers by using a five-point 
scale (1=not at all, 5=strongly). Each item began with “when I work on creative tasks with 
my coworkers within my team, I feel…” Items for positive activated affect included 
“enthusiastic,” “inspired,” and “excited” (t2 α=.85). Items for positive deactivating affect 
included “at ease,” “calm,” “laid back,” and “relaxed” (t2 α=.85). Items for negative 
activating affect included “nervous,” “tense,” and “worried” (t2 α=.92). Items for negative 
deactivating affect included “depressed,” “dejected,” and “hopeless” (t2 α=.88).  
Cognitive flexibility. I used four items from Martin and Rubin (1995) to measure 
cognitive flexibility (t2 α=.85). These items included (a) “in this team, I am willing to work 
at creative solutions to problems;” (b) “when I work in this team, I have many possible 
ways of behaving in any given situation;” (c) “I am willing to listen and consider 
alternatives for handling a problem;” and (d) “I have the self-confidence necessary to try 
different ways of behaving.” 
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Cognitive persistence. On the basis of the items of need for cognition (Cacioppo & 
Petty, 1982) and dimensions of mastery (Morgan, Busch-rossnagel, Barrett, & Wang, 
2014), I constructed a four-item scale with the following items (α=.86): (a) “when I work 
in this team, I try to find solutions to a problem even if it will take a long time to finish;” 
(b) “when I work within this team, I work for a long time trying to do something difficult;” 
(c) “I work for a long time trying to solve a problem when I am working in this team;” and 
(d) “in this team, I prefer an intellectual task to one that doesn’t require much thought.”  
Cognitive demotivation. Drawing on the need for cognition items (Cacioppo & Petty, 
1982), I constructed a measure for assessing cognitive demotivation that included the 
following items (α=.86): (a) “when I work in this team, I prefer simple to complex 
problems;” (b) “in this team, I don’t like having the responsibility to handle situations that 
require a lot of thinking;” (c) “when I work in this team, I try to anticipate and avoid 
situations where I may be required to think deeply about something;” and (d) “when I work 
in this team, I would rather do something that requires little thought than something that 
challenges my thinking abilities.”  
Radical creativity and incremental creativity. I used four items from Madjar, 
Greenberg, and Chen (2011) and Jaussi and Randel (2014) to assess radical and 
incremental creativity, respectively. I changed the referent of scale items from “I” to “s/he” 
to evaluate follower creativity. Items for radical creativity (α=.90) included (a) “s/he is a 
good source of highly creative ideas,” (b) “s/he demonstrates originality in his/her work,” 
(c) “s/he suggests radically new ways for doing his/her work,” and (d) “s/he identifies 
opportunities for new processes.” Items for incremental creativity (α=.85) included (a) 
“s/he uses previously existing ideas or work in a slightly different fashion,” (b) sS/he is 
very good at adapting existing ideas,” (c) “s/he easily modifies previously existing work 
processes to suit his/her current needs,” and (d) “S/he finds new uses for existing methods 
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or equipment.” I added instructions at the top of each page of the leader survey to clarify 
that the questions correspond to employees’ creative outcomes only and that general job 
performance was not the focal interest of this survey.  
Creative disengagement. I developed a four-item measure to assess disengagement 
from creativity by adapting disengagement measures of intellectual engagement inventory 
(Major & Schmader, 1998). I shifted the referent from “I” to “s/he” and customized the 
context from academic intelligence to disengagement from creativity. Items in this scale 
included (a) “s/he really doesn’t care what others say about his/her creativity,” (b) “creative 
evaluations will not change his/her opinion of her/himself at work,” (c) “s/he doesn’t care 
about making creative solutions,” and (d) “It usually doesn’t matter to him/her how 
creative s/he is” (α=.84). 
Control variables. In addition to the aforementioned variables, I included several 
control variables to minimize the potential confounding effects on the associations among 
the variables in the current model. I controlled for demographic characteristics, including 
age, function, total tenure, and tenure in the current team and company, because these 
demographic variables are likely to influence employees’ reactions to team dynamics and 
subsequent creative outcomes (Bunderson, 2003; S. J. Shin et al., 2012). Given that the 
sample includes various types of teams across different industries, I controlled for team 
and leader characteristics, including industry, leader age, and leader education. Several 
dummy variables reflecting the industry (manufacturing and IT/programming which are 
two main source of the data), employee function (1=clerical, 0=others), and employee and 
leader gender (1=male, 0=female) were also included in the analysis. In addition to 
demographic variables and team characteristics, I controlled for social comparison 
orientation because of its potential effect on social-comparison-related reactions (Buunk, 
Zurriaga, Peíró, Nauta, & Gosalvez, 2005). I used the short version of Gibbons and 
85 
Buunk’s (1999) social comparison orientation measure, which included the following 
items (α=.88): (a) “I always pay a lot of attention to how I do things compared with how 
others do things;” (b) “I often compare how I am doing socially (e.g., social skills, 
popularity) with other people;” (c) “I am not the type of person who compares 
himself/herself often with others” (reversed); (d) “I often try to find out what others think 
when they face similar problems as I face;” (e) “I like to know what others would do in a 
similar situation;” and (f) “If I want to learn more about something, I try to find out what 
others think about it.” 
CHAPTER 5. RESULTS 
1. Preliminary Analysis 
Before testing the hypotheses developed in the previous chapter, I conducted 
preliminary tests to ensure empirical distinctiveness of the study variables. I first assessed 
the internal consistency reliability (Cronbach’s α) of all variables and then evaluated the 
within-group agreement (   ) and ICC for creative requirement and creativity resources 
to justify group-level aggregation of these variables, which was reported in the previous 
chapter. Second, I performed a multilevel confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) on the full 
model with individual-level variables (i.e., upward social comparison, affective reactions, 
cognitive processes, creativity outcomes, relevance for creativity, perceived attainability) 
and on the full model including team-level variables reflecting team context for creativity 
(i.e., creative requirement, resources for creativity) to ensure the distinctiveness of the 
study variables. I also conducted CFA on the constructs assessed by employees (upward 
social comparison, affective reactions, cognitive processes, relevance for creativity, and 
perceived attainability) and by team leaders (radical creativity, incremental creativity, and 
creative disengagement). The hypothesized model exhibited good fit to the data. 
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Furthermore, I performed a series of alternative CFA on four affective reactions, three 
cognitive states, and three creative outcomes. For example, I constructed alternative 
models of plausible two-factor model of affective reactions (by combining emotions into 
two factors reflecting positive and negative emotions; χ2[64]=951.64, p<.001, 
RMSEA=.22, CFI=.60, TLI=.51, and SRMR=.18), two-factor model of cognitive process 
(by combining cognitive flexibility and cognitive persistence; χ2[53]=271.50, p<.001, 
RMSEA=.12, CFI=.84, TLI=.80, and SRMR=.07), and a two-factor model of creative 
outcome (by combining radical creativity and incremental creativity; χ2[34]=125.80, 
p<.001, RMSEA=.10, CFI=.95, TLI=.93, and SRMR=.05). The alternative models showed 
significantly poorer fit, confirming empirical validity of the hypothesized factor structures. 
Given the empirical confirmations from preliminary analysis, I tested the hypothesized 
relationships. Table 1 provides the results of the CFA analyses. Table 2 presents the 
descriptive statistics and intercorrelations between all variables examined in the study. 
2. Multilevel Analytic Strategy 
 I used Mplus 8.0 (Muthén & Muthén, 2017) to account for the nested structure of the 
present data because it enables simultaneous tests of multiple relationships by using 
multilevel structural equation modeling. I conducted a structural path analysis using the 
scale means of each variable instead of item-level indicators because the present model 
has numerous parameters (Bandalos & Finney, 2001; Sung & Choi, 2018).  
 I first conducted single- and multi-level analyses to examine the moderated 
relationships because these hypotheses contain single- and multi-level structure, where 
team-level variables (i.e., creative requirement, resources for creativity) moderated the 
relationship between upward social comparison and outcome variables. 
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Table 1. Confirmatory Factor Analysis Models 
Model Description  
  df p RMSEA CFI TLI SRMR(W) SRMR(B) 
Single-level full 
model 
Upward social comparison, Affective 
reactions, Cognitive processes, 
Creativity outcomes, Relevance for 
creativity, Perceived attainability 
1573.605 1002 0.000 0.039 0.932 0.924 0.053  
Multilevel full 
model 
Upward social comparison, Affective 
reactions, Cognitive processes, 
Creativity outcomes, Creative 
requirement, Resources for creativity 
1575.298 1068 0.000 0.036 0.942 0.935 0.055 0.304 
Member-rated 
variables 
Upward social comparison, Affective 
reactions, Cognitive processes, 
Relevance for creativity, Perceived 
attainability 
1039.015 620 0.000 0.043 0.934 0.925 0.058  
Affective 
reactions 
Activated positive affect, Activated 
negative affect, Deactivated positive 
affect, Deactivated negative affect 
170.098 59 0.000 0.081 0.949 0.933 0.069  
Cognitive 
processes 
Cognitive flexibility, Cognitive 
persistence, Cognitive demotivation 
91.334 51 0.000 0.052 0.971 0.962 0.040  
Creative 
outcomes 
Radical creativity, Incremental 
creativity, Creative disengagement 
60.005 32 0.002 0.056 0.984 0.978 0.036  
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Table 2. Means, Standard Deviations, Correlations for Variables (1/2) 
    M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1 Leader Gendera     0.69      0.46                
2 Leader Age   43.45      6.07   .37**              
3 Leader Function (dummy)     0.52      0.50   .28** .23**             
4 Manufacturing (dummy)     0.24      0.42  -.29** .17** -.08            
5 IT/Programming (dummy)     0.21      0.41  .36** .05 -.14** -.29**           
6 Gendera     0.40      0.49   .31** .20** .09 -.19** .34**          
7 Age   33.55      5.80   .20** .36** .18** -.03 .02 .20**         
8 Team Tenure   25.88    26.88  .07 .14* .04 .04 .02 -.01 .27**        
9 Company Tenure   39.93    40.85  .06 .17* .05 -.07 -.05 .02 .50** .60**       
10 Total Tenure   91.36    60.96  .09 .26** .15** .05 -.03 -.02 .79** .26** .39**      
11 Function (dummy)b     0.45      0.50  .15** .11* .53** -.19** -.13* -.02 .18** .05 .24** .07     
12 Hierarchical Level     2.03      1.05  .22** .34** .14* .10 .01 .20** .73** .28** .39** .65** .05    
13 Social Comparison Orientation     2.98      0.80  -.03 -.09 .11 -.05 -.12* -.02 -.14* .02 .06 -.11 .09 -.10   
14 Upward Social Comparison      3.28      0.69  -.05 .04 -.04 .11* -.10 .00 .02 -.02 .00 .05 -.10 .07 -.03  
15 Creative Requirement     3.83      0.55  .09 .29** -.20** .23** -.05 -.07 .00 -.02 -.13* .09 -.29** .20** -.01 .36** 
16 Resources for Creativity     2.96      0.56  -.01 .12* -.01 .05 .14** .09 .18** .06 .11 .09 .00 .19** .03 .31** 
17 Relevance for Creativity     3.85      0.81  .11 .23** -.07 .19** .06 .13* .01 -.04 -.10 .05 -.20** .13* .06 .33** 
18 Perceived Attainability     3.93      0.65  -.04 .06 .01 .21** -.07 .07 -.09 -.02 -.14* -.04 -.11* .00 .08 .17** 
19 Activated Positive Affect     3.58      0.69  -.01 .06 -.01 .23** -.12 -.02 .04 .00 .07 .00 -.02 .03 .04 .28** 
20 Activated Negative Affect     2.39      0.94  -.02 .07 -.02 -.09 -.10 -.09 -.01 .01 .06 -.08 .08 -.04 .19** -.04 
21 Deactivated Positive Affect     2.70      0.70  .03 .10 .05 -.12 .05 .15* .14 -.08 -.01 .07 -.02 .10 -.16* -.02 
22 Deactivated Negative Affect     1.91      0.85  -.01 .04 .04 -.06 .01 -.06 -.08 -.03 -.03 -.03 .06 -.05 .15* -.23** 
23 Cognitive Flexibility     3.65      0.62  -.04 .09 -.08 .24** -.14* .10 .06 .03 .02 .06 -.13 .07 .08 .26** 
24 Cognitive Persistence     3.74      0.67  -.01 .03 -.08 .15* -.08 .13 -.05 .06 -.03 -.06 -.14* -.07 -.04 .16* 
25 Cognitive Demotivation     2.29      0.77  .07 -.05 .07 -.19** -.04 -.06 -.16* -.13 .00 -.15* .19** -.12 .17* -.09 
26 Radical Creativity     3.04      0.74  -.01 .18** -.04 .04 -.08 .11 .09 -.15* -.04 .09 -.12 .13 .11 .08 
27 Incremental Creativity     3.30      0.71  .01 .17* -.01 .15* -.08 -.03 .13 -.08 .06 .15* -.08 .19** .12 .01 
28 Creative Disengagement     2.56      0.74  .11 -.05 .02 -.16* .12 .12 .16* .19** .12 .12 .16* .04 -.15* -.16* 
Note. N = 398. *p < .05, ** p < .01.  a: 1 = male, 0 = female. b: 1 = clerical function, 0 = others. 
Table 2. Means, Standard Deviations, Correlations for Variables (2/2) 
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    M SD 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 
1 Leader Gendera     0.69      0.46              
 
2 Leader Age   43.45      6.07               
3 Leader Function (dummy)     0.52      0.50               
4 Manufacturing (dummy)     0.24      0.42               
5 IT/Programming (dummy)     0.21      0.41               
6 Gendera     0.40      0.49               
7 Age   33.55      5.80               
8 Team Tenure   25.88    26.88               
9 Company Tenure   39.93    40.85               
10 Total Tenure   91.36    60.96               
11 Function (dummy)b     0.45      0.50               
12 Hierarchical Level     2.03      1.05               
13 Social Comparison Orientation     2.98      0.80               
14 Upward Social Comparison      3.28      0.69               
15 Creative Requirement     3.83      0.55               
16 Resources for Creativity     2.96      0.56  .16**             
17 Relevance for Creativity     3.85      0.81  .50** .17**            
18 Perceived Attainability     3.93      0.65  .20** .01 .49**           
19 Activated Positive Affect     3.58      0.69  .15* .16* .31** .28**          
20 Activated Negative Affect     2.39      0.94  .11 .00 -.09 -.17** -.12         
21 Deactivated Positive Affect     2.70      0.70  -.02 .08 .09 .15* .08 -.36**        
22 Deactivated Negative Affect     1.91      0.85  .03 -.19** -.09 -.23** -.42** .54** -.07       
23 Cognitive Flexibility     3.65      0.62  .20** .10 .38** .43** .46** -.28** .10 -.34**      
24 Cognitive Persistence     3.74      0.67  .03 .11 .30** .32** .33** -.26** .10 -.31** .54**     
25 Cognitive Demotivation     2.29      0.77  -.07 -.15* -.20** -.24** -.29** .24** .06 .38** -.32** -.34**    
26 Radical Creativity     3.04      0.74  .20** .04 .27** .16* .17* -.02 .10 -.07 .23** .14 -.14*   
27 Incremental Creativity     3.30      0.71  .16* -.02 .18* .10 .14 -.08 .05 -.11 .20** .11 -.17* .72**  
28 Creative Disengagement     2.56      0.74  -.43** -.14* -.36** -.15* -.28** .01 .03 .07 -.38** -.18* .18* -.62** -.52** 
Note. N = 398. *p < .05, ** p < .01.  a: 1 = male, 0 = female. b: 1 = clerical function, 0 = others. 
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For the moderation analysis, I grand-mean centered all variables before entering them 
into the analysis to reduce the possibility of multicollinearity (Preacher, Zhang, & Zyphur, 
2011; Preacher, Zyphur, & Zhang, 2010). Second, I conducted multilevel path analysis to 
examine key effects of the variables controlling for other independent variables. I 
incorporated all hypothesized paths in a single structural model, which had good fit to the 
current data by using CFA. Third, I performed Monte Carlo bootstrapping, which is widely 
believed to have high accuracy because it is based on repeated resampling for each 
confidence interval, to consider indirect effects and conditional indirect effects (Bauer, 
Preacher, & Gil, 2006). I ran SEM analyses with grand mean-centered variables and then 
input the unstandardized coefficients of paths, their variances and covariances, and the 
corresponding formula into the web-based utility developed by Tofighi and MacKinnon, 
(2016)1. The significance of the hypothesized paths was estimated by 95% Monte Carlo 
confidence intervals.  
3. Hypotheses Testing 
Hypotheses 1a and 1b proposed that upward social comparison interacts with creative 
requirement and resources for creativity to predict individual creativity. Table 3 shows that 
upward social comparison has a significant interaction with resources for creativity in 
predicting radical creativity (β=.70, p< .01), partly supporting Hypothesis 1b. Hypotheses 
2a–b proposed the moderated relationship between upward social comparison and 
affective reactions. Table 4 shows that the relationship between upward social comparison 
and deactivated negative affect is positively moderated by creative requirement (β=.72, 




Table 3. Multilevel Analysis Predicting Creative Outcomes 
   Radical Creativity     Incremental Creativity   
Predictors M 1 M 2 M3 M 4 M 5 M 6 
Level 2. Team Level      
Leader Gender -0.26 -0.25 -0.08 -0.06 -0.06 -0.31
Leader Age 0.32 0.31 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.09
Leader Education 0.13 0.12 0.08 0.26 0.26 0.21
Team Size 0.18 0.19 0.09 0.02 0.03 -0.02
Manufacturing (Dummy) -0.32 -0.30 -0.20 0.14 0.15 0.09
IT/Programming (Dummy) -0.28 -0.29 -0.18 -0.12 -0.12 -0.05
Creative Requirement   0.35  0.30
Resources for Creativity  -0.07  -0.01
Level 1. Individual Level       
Gender 0.14 0.14 0.09* 0.05 0.05 0.04
Age *0.08 -0.04 -0.04 -0.12 -0.12 -0.08
Team Tenure -.22* -0.21* -0.07* -0.25** -0.25** -0.10*
Company Tenure 0.11 0.10 0.04 0.20 0.20 0.08
Total Tenure 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.07
Function -0.04 -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 0.00
Hierarchical Level 0.08 0.07 0.00 0.18 0.17 0.06
Social Comparison Orientation 0.13 0.13 0.07 0.15* 0.15 0.10*
Upward Social Comparison 
(USC) 
0.03 -0.09  0.00 -0.02
USC*Requirement   0.28  -0.01
USC*Resources  0.70**  0.53
Ind-lv Variance (σ²) 0.900 0.893 0.824 0.883 0.879 0.817
Change in Variance (Δσ²)  0.007 0.076  0.004 0.066
Proportion of Explained Variance (%)  0.8% 8.4%   0.5% 7.5%
Note. Employee-level N = 306, Team-level N = 80, * p < .05; ** p < .01 
supporting the hypotheses. Interaction plots in Figure 9 (Aiken & West 1991) show that 
when employees perceive they can compare with others’ superior performance, their 
deactivated negative emotional reaction is even more reduced. The relationship between 
upward social comparison and negative activated affect is marginally moderated by 
creative requirement (β=.43, p<.1). When creativity is highly required in a team, 
employees react negatively toward upward social comparison. 
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I conducted a multilevel structural path analysis allowing all parameters 
simultaneously for all variables except moderators to examine the relationships between 
affective reactions and cognitive processes proposed in Hypotheses 3a–c. Figure 10 shows 
the standardized results of this analysis. This model provided an acceptable fit to the data. 
As expected, activated positive emotion is positively related with cognitive flexibility 
(β=.38, p<.001), supporting Hypothesis 3a. In addition, activated positive affect is 
positively related to cognitive persistence (β=.28, p<.001) and negatively related to 
cognitive demotivation (β=−.15, p<.10). Activated negative affect is negatively related to 
cognitive flexibility (β=−.22, p<.01) and cognitive persistence (β=−.18, p<.05), rejecting 
Hypothesis 3b. Hypothesis 3c expected that deactivated positive and negative affects are 
positively related to cognitive demotivation. The result partially supports this hypothesis 
because deactivated positive affect is not significantly related to cognitive demotivation, 
and deactivated negative affect shows a marginally significant relationship (β=.24, p< .10).  
Hypotheses 5a–c proposed the relationship between cognitive processes and creative 
outcome. Figure 10 depicts that cognitive flexibility is positively related to radical 
creativity (β=.18, p<.01), supporting Hypothesis 5a. In addition, cognitive flexibility 
shows a positive relationship with incremental creativity (β=.15, p<.05) and a negative 
relationship with creative disengagement (β=−.34, p<.001). Cognitive persistence is not 
significantly related to creative outcomes, rejecting Hypothesis 5b. Cognitive 
demotivation is not significantly related to creative disengagement, rejecting Hypothesis 
5c. However, cognitive demotivation is negatively related to incremental creativity 
(β=−.16, p<.05). 
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Table 4 Results of Moderation Analyses Predicting Affective Reactions (1/2) 
  Activated Positive Affect Activated Negative Affect 
Predictors M 1 M 2 M 3 M 4 M 5 M 6 M 7 M 8 M 9 M 10 M 11 M 12 
Level 2. Team Level             
Leader Gender 0.40+ 0.47* .42+ .37+ 0.34 0.22 -0.16 -0.20 -0.17 -0.15 -0.12 -0.34 
Leader Age -0.16 -0.16 -0.16 0.17 -0.18 -0.11 0.37 .37* .39+ 0.37 .35+ 0.24 
Leader Function -0.14 -0.08 -0.06 -0.1 -0.08 -0.05 -0.22 -0.21 -0.21 -0.21 -0.24 -0.15 
Manufacturing (Dummy) 0.44* 0.46* .40+ .38* 0.31+ 0.22 -0.52* -.51* -.48* -0.48* -.34+ -0.24+ 
IT/Programming (Dummy) -0.20 -0.17 -0.16 -0.17 -0.14 -0.08 -0.37* -.37* -.36* -0.37* -0.13 -0.11 
Creative Requirement     0.11 0.03     0.27 0.20 
Resources for Creativity     0.21 0.15     -0.09 -0.13 
Level 1. Individual Level             
Gender 0.11 0.09 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.03 -0.08 -0.08 -0.07 -0.09 -.15+ -0.07+ 
Age -0.02 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.17 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.11 0.11 0.19 0.06 
Team Tenure 0.12 0.10 0.08 0.09 0.05 0.04** -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
Company Tenure -0.05 -0.05 -0.07 -0.08 0.02 -0.00** 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.04 
Total Tenure 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.02 -0.10 -0.03** -0.17 -0.17 -0.17 -0.18 -.30* -0.17* 
Function 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.09 0.05 0.02 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.02 
Hierarchical Level -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.08 -0.04 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.06 
Social Comparison Orientation -0.03 -0.02 -0.05 -0.04 0.00 -0.01 0.12* .11* .15* 0.14* .19* 0.14** 
Upward Social Comparison  0.24** 0.22 .11+ .20* 0.186  -0.07 -0.06 -0.04 -0.08 -0.11 
Relevance for Creativity   0.13 .16+     -0.02 -0.04   
Perceived Attainability   0.10 0.08     -.16+ -0.12   
USC*Relevance    0.03      0.06   
USC*Attainability    0.05      -0.13   
USC*Requirement      -0.58       0.43+ 
USC*Resources      -0.09       0.02 
Ind-level Variance σ² 0.982 0.926 0.888 0.918 0.876 0.855 0.962 0.958 0.925 0.921 0.865 0.759 
Change in Variance Δσ²  0.056 0.094 0.064 0.106 0.127  0.004 0.037 0.041 0.097 0.203 
Proportion of Explained Variance (%) 5.7% 9.6% 6.5% 10.8% 12.9%  0.4% 3.8% 4.3% 10.1% 21.1% 
Note. + p < .1, *p < .05, ** p < .01
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Table 4 Results of Moderation Analyses Predicting Affective Reactions (2/2) 
  Deactivated Positive Affect Deactivated Negative Affect 
Predictors M 13 M 14 M 15 M 16 M 17 M 18 M 19 M 20 M 21 M 22 M 23 M 24 
Level 2. Team Level             
Leader Gender -.64* -0.64* -.60* -.59* -.41+ -0.28 -0.23 -0.28 -0.28 -0.23 -0.26 -0.13 
Leader Age .66* 0.66* .63* .63* 0.35 0.20 0.245 0.24 0.25 0.21 0.30 0.17 
Leader Function 0.35 0.35 0.32 0.31 0.39 0.29 0.18 0.10 0.06 0.13 0.17 0.11 
Manufacturing (Dummy) -.59* -0.59* .52* .51* -.38* -0.26 -0.23 -0.20 -0.16 -0.18 -0.18 -0.12 
IT/Programming (Dummy) 0.27 0.27 0.25 0.27 0.06 0.05 0.09 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.14 0.08 
Creative Requirement     0.02 0.04     0.33 0.27 
Resources for Creativity     0.32 0.39     -.44+ -0.40+ 
Level 1. Individual Level             
Gender 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.07 0.05 -0.08 -0.07 -0.06 -0.09 -0.07 -0.04 
Age -0.06 -0.06 -0.11 -0.09 0.19 0.11 -0.08 -0.09 -0.06 -0.08 -0.19 -0.09 
Team Tenure -.13* -0.13* -0.11 -0.11+ -0.1 -0.07 -0.11 -0.09 -0.07 -0.05 -0.07 -0.04 
Company Tenure 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.04 0.15* .15* 0.12 .13* 0.05 0.05 
Total Tenure 0.07 0.07 0.03 0.02 -0.15 -0.10 0.00 -0.01 0.16 0.01 0.11 0.02 
Function -0.14* -0.14* -.15+ -0.14 -.18+ -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.09 -0.12 0 -0.01 
Hierarchical Level 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.09 0.001 0.01 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.03 
Social Comparison Orientation -0.09 -0.09 -.13+ -0.12 -0.11 -0.08 0.17* 0.17* .21** 0.19* .16* 0.12* 
Upward Social Comparison  0.007 0.00 -0.04 -0.05 -0.06  -.23** -.24**  -0.14* -.20** -0.2 
Relevance for Creativity   -0.03 -0.01     0.09 0.06   
Perceived Attainability   .20+ 0.19+     .28** -.22**   
USC*Relevance    0.02      0.07   
USC*Attainability    0.05      -.19**   
USC*Requirement      0.33      0.72* 
USC*Resources      -0.29      -0.09 
Ind-level Variance σ² 0.956 0.956 0.912 0.912 0.874 0.844 0.955 0.903 0.821 0.832 0.841 0.780 
Change in Variance Δσ²  0.000 0.044 0.044 0.082 0.112  0.052 0.134 0.123 0.114 0.175 
Proportion of Explained Variance (%) 0.0% 4.6% 4.6% 8.6% 11.7%  5.4% 14.0% 12.9% 11.9% 18.3% 
Note. + p < .1, *p < .05, ** p < .01
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Figure 9 Interaction between Upward Social Comparison and Team Context on Affective Reactions 
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Figure 10 Results of the Main Effect Model 
 
Note. N=306, Dashed lines are p<.1, χ2(71)=104.12, p<.01, RMSEA=.04, CFI=.95, TLI=.91, SRMR=.06  
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This result agrees with Hypothesis 5c, which suggests negative effect of cognitive 
demotivation on creativity.  
I tested the indirect effect of upward social comparison on cognitive processes through 
affective reactions by employing a Monte Carlo bootstrapping method, producing unbiased 
indirect effect estimate with 95% confidence interval (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). Table 5 
shows that, through activated positive affect, upward social comparison has indirect effect 
on cognitive flexibility (indirect effect unstandardized estimate[bind]=.101, CI [.041, .177]), 
cognitive persistence (bind=.083, CI [.031, .146]), and cognitive demotivation (bind=−.051, 
CI [−.114, −.0001]). Thus, only Hypothesis 4a was supported, and Hypothesis 4b, 4c, and 
4d were rejected. 















0.101* 0.041 0.177 
Cognitive 
Persistence 
0.083* 0.031 0.146 
Cognitive 
Demotivation 
-0.051* -0.114 -0.0001 
Note. N= 301; Unstd. = Unstandardized; LLCI = Lower limit confidence interval; ULCI = Upper 
limit confidence interval. a These values are calculated on the basis of the unstandardized path 
coefficients by using Monte Carlo simulation. * 95% confidence interval excludes zero. 
 
In addition, I calculated the indirect effect of affective reactions on creativity through 
cognitive processes. Table 6 reports through its direct effect on cognitive flexibility that 
activated positive affect has indirect effect on radical creativity (bind=.079, CI [.018, .158]), 
incremental creativity (bind=.063, CI [.002, .141]), and creative disengagement (bind=−.147, 
CI [−.254, −.062]). Through cognitive flexibility, activated negative affect has indirect 
effect on radical creativity (bind=−.032, CI [−.075, −.004]), incremental creativity 
(bind=−.027, CI [−.070, −.0001]), and creative disengagement (bind=.059, CI [.012, .121]). 
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0.079* 0.018 0.158 
Incremental 
Creativity 
0.063* 0.002 0.141 
Creative 
Disengagement 








-0.032* -0.075 -0.004 
Incremental 
Creativity 
-0.027* -0.070 -0.0001 
Creative 
Disengagement 
0.059* 0.012 0.121 
Note. N= 301; Unstd. = Unstandardized; LLCI = Lower limit confidence interval; ULCI = Upper 
limit confidence interval. a These values are calculated based on the unstandardized path 
coefficients by using Monte Carlo simulation. * 95% confidence interval excludes zero. 
 
I also tested conditional indirect effect of creative requirement and creativity resources 
on the relationship between upward social comparison and cognitive processes through 
affective reactions. I computed Monte Carlo confidence interval analysis with 5,000 times 
bootstrapping for all possible paths, but Table 7 shows no significance paths.  

























High (+1SD) -.141 -.824 .194 
Low (-1SD) .477 -.070 1.529 
Difference .597 .006 1.188 
Support for 
Creativity 
High (+1SD) .192 -.279 .718 
Low (-1SD) .142 -.220 .813 











High (+1SD) -.125 -.836 .263 
Low (-1SD) .493 -.075 1.610 
Difference .594 .004 1.186 
Support for 
Creativity 
High (+1SD) .209 -.298 .796 
Low (-1SD) .159 -.249 .902 
Difference -.196 -.795 .406 
Note. Bootstrap sample size = 5,000. LLCI = lower limit confidence interval; ULCI = upper limit 
confidence interval.  
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CHAPTER 6. DISCUSSION 
Summary of Findings  
This study was developed to extend and enhance our understanding of team dynamics 
in relation to creativity from a social cognitive perspective by providing a new framework 
connecting upward social comparison and creative outcomes. The main argument is that 
upward social comparison is related to employee creativity through an emotional and 
cognitive process. Thus, I developed the framework to predict three types of creative 
outcomes, namely, radical creativity, incremental creativity, and creative disengagement. I 
combined four aspects of emotions, namely, activated positive emotion, activated negative 
emotion, deactivated positive emotion, and deactivated negative emotion, and three types 
of cognitive reactions, namely, cognitive flexibility, cognitive persistence, and cognitive 
demotivation, on the basis of the dual pathway model (De Dreu et al., 2008). 
Upward social comparison shows consistent positive effects on team members’ 
affective reaction. The hypothesized relationship that the affected reactions will be 
determined by organizational context is not supported. Upward social comparison is 
positively related to activated positive emotion and negatively related to deactivated 
negative emotion. Considering that deactivated negative emotion is located on the 
diagonally opposite side of the circumplex, upward social comparison has emotionally 
positive and elevating effects for team members.  
The findings reveal that affective reactions to upward social comparison are related 
to cognitive processes. Activated positive emotion is positively related to cognitive 
flexibility and cognitive persistence but negatively related to cognitive demotivation. By 
contrast, activated negative emotion is positively related to cognitive demotivation but 
negatively related to cognitive flexibility and cognitive persistence. The results also reveal 
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that cognitive flexibility is positively related to radical and incremental creativity and 
negatively related to creative disengagement. However, cognitive persistence is not 
significantly related to incremental creativity. As hypothesized, deactivated positive 
emotion is related to cognitive demotivation, which, in turn, is negatively related to radical 
and incremental creativity but positively related to creative disengagement. The results 
have interesting implications for creativity researchers because theories of dual pathway 
model and previous empirical studies based on laboratory experiments typically argued 
that activated positive emotion is related to creativity through cognitive flexibility, whereas 
activated negative emotion is related to creativity via cognitive persistence. The findings 
suggest that in actual organizational teams, the effect of activated negative emotion may 
turn out differently, which is a unique contribution of this study.   
Implications on Creativity Literature 
This work significantly contributes to the creativity literature in several ways. The 
major contribution of this study is the introduction of a well-established social 
psychological theory of social comparison to organizational creativity literature. In 
previous creativity literature, a person–situation interactionist view was dominantly used 
to explain creativity (e.g., Choi, 2004a; Oldham & Cummings, 1996; Shalley et al., 2004). 
Extant studies considered individuals as independent entities and focused on within-
individual process. This stream of studies tended to examine individual characteristics or 
environmental factors that motivate individuals to be creative. What has been largely 
neglected is that man is a social animal, as Aristotle said. With increasing dependence on 
team systems in contemporary organizations, the importance of inter-member dynamics in 
creativity research has gained recent interest. According to Perry-Smith and Mannucci 
(2017, p. 53), “the notion that creativity is a social process has increasingly gained 
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prominence.” As creativity is known to be affected by social relationships with others in 
the work community (Amabile, 1988; Woodman, Sawyer, & Griffin, 1993), many attempts 
have been made (e.g., Rouge, 2018; Perry-Smith & Mannucci, 2017; Ma, 2009; Perry-
Smith & Shalley, 2003) to capture the social aspects of creativity. Unfortunately, these 
attempts neglected to explain social cognitive aspects of creativity, wherein people can 
acquire knowledge and change their behaviors by observing others without direct 
interactions with others, such as social exchange or feedback. Moreover, research that 
addressed social relationships between members in organizational teams in relation to 
creativity was limited to diversity (S. J. Shin et al., 2012). Considering that people have a 
constant innate drive to make social comparison with others (Festinger, 1954), it is crucial 
to examine social comparison processes in studying creativity in organizational team 
settings. The current study successfully adopted social comparison theory to examine the 
effects of social relationships between team members and to examine the neglected area 
of research.  
This study expanded and contributed to the recent trends of investigating the 
multifaceted nature of creativity by providing distinctive preceding mechanisms for three 
different types of creativity, namely, radical and incremental creativity and creative 
disengagement (Sternberg, 1999; Sung et al., 2011). Although radical and incremental 
creativity are important to organizations, they must be differentially managed because one 
focuses on prosperity and growth of the firm, whereas the other focuses on survival and 
continuance of an organization. I introduced creative disengagement, which refers to one’s 
withdrawal of time and effort from engaging in creative behaviors. I then elaborated a 
comprehensive model examining differential mediating paths connecting social 
comparison and different types of creativity to denote the lowest level of creativity 
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engagement. My findings suggest that affective reactions to social comparison affect 
different types of creativity through different cognitive processes. This study successfully 
suggested cognitive demotivation as a possible inhibitor of creativity because the result 
shows that cognitively demotivated individuals disengage from creativity. I extended the 
literature by providing a fine-grained analysis of affective and cognitive processes and 
creativity. Moreover, going beyond extant studies that compare creative performance with 
routine, noncreative work (Madjar, Greenberg, & Chen 2011), my study offered a unique 
contribution by presenting a pure comparison within the creative performance dimension. 
The current study provided a new framework for understanding social aspects of 
creativity in organizational teams by enlightening the intermediate process connecting 
social comparison and creativity. This study successfully presented cognitive demotivation 
as a possible inhibitor of creativity while integrating emotional and cognitive processes. 
Implications on Social Comparison Literature 
The current research made significant contributions to social comparison literature.  
1. Revealed positive effects of upward social comparison in organizational teams 
First, this study remarkably revealed that upward social comparison has distinct and 
stable positive emotional reactions in organizational team settings. Early studies suggested 
that downward comparison improves self-esteem and subjective well-being and generates 
a positive affect (Wills, 1981). In contrast, upward comparison was supposed to diminish 
self-esteem and generate a negative affect, such as envy, anger, and resentment (Alicke & 
Zell, 2008; Buunk & Gibbons, 2000; Gibbons & Gerrard, 1989; Wood, 1989). Researchers 
then found that reactions to upward comparison may either be positive or negative 
depending on situational factors (Buunk, Collins, Taylor, Vanyperen, & Dakof, 1990; J. P. 
Gerber et al., 2018; Richard H. Smith, 2000). For example, Smith (2000) and Buunk et al. 
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(2005) showed that upward comparison can have positive and negative effects depending 
on several dimensions, such as perceived control and desirability of comparison results. A 
recent meta-analysis commented that negative reactions toward upward social comparison 
are dominant, especially when ability estimates are concerned (J. P. Gerber, Wheeler, & 
Suls, 2017). Thus, negative reactions can be expected for social comparison of creative 
ability, depending on contingency factors. Unlike previous literature, the results of the 
current study demonstrate consistent positive reactions to upward social comparison, 
which is an encouraging finding.  
Possible explanation 1. Task characteristics of organizational teams  
Several possible reasons can explain this surprising result. First, this gap may be due 
to the difference in the task characteristics in the study design of this study, which is 
explicitly based on empirical data collected from organizational team workers. Most 
previous research was based on experimental studies, where social comparison is made on 
independent tasks. For this sample, I collected multi-wave data from 80 teams in over 10 
organizations with diverse backgrounds. In contemporary organizations, members from 
the same team usually work in reciprocal interdependence, especially when in knowledge-
dependent or creative jobs (Baruah & Paulus, 2009; Pee, Kankanhalli, & Kim, 2010; 
Thompson, 1967). Unlike jobs with pooled interdependence where members work and 
contribute independently, those with reciprocal interdependence need mutual adjustment 
between members. Therefore, the outcome of one member is closely correlated with that 
of other members when they are reciprocally interdependent. (In addition, team members 
cooperate with coworkers to achieve a common goal because an organizational team shares 
a common goal among its members.) Given that the accomplishment of one’s task depends 
not only on independent accomplishment but also on coordination among team members, 
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the superb ability of coworkers can be interpreted as a helpful or profitable asset to one’s 
performance, leading to positive affective reactions. By contrast, experimental participants 
must make comparisons with others on manipulated tasks, which are independent than 
interdependent. Considering that the negative or mixed results of upward social 
comparison were mostly based on experimental studies, reactions to upward social 
comparison of coworkers’ creative ability in actual organizational teams turned out 
positive.  
Possible explanation 2. Relational characteristics of organizational teams  
In addition to the task characteristics discussed above, I also suggested that relational 
characteristics within organizational teams explain the study result. In experimental studies 
that most previous social comparison studies have pursued, participants tend to have very 
short-term relationships with comparison targets on a one-off task. Moreover, the majority 
of experimental studies have undergraduate students, who are used to having good grades 
when they outperform others and having lower grades when classmates make superior 
performance, as participants. In such cases, superior performances of comparison targets 
tend to be construed as impediments to good performance of the focal person because other 
participants are mere objects of comparison. Thus, participants to experimental studies 
tend to react negatively to counterparts’ good performance, especially when ability is 
concerned.  
By contrast, organizational team members share a long history of working together 
because most teams last for months to years. Considering that team longevity is related to 
trust among members, the participants of the current study (team tenure mean=26 months) 
should believe in benevolence and integrity of team members, which are two of three 
characteristics of a trustee that determine trustworthiness (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 
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1995): ability, benevolence, and integrity. Organizational team members tend to have a 
higher level of trust among themselves, especially benevolence and integrity (compared 
with experimental participants) (J. K. Wang, Ashleigh, & Meyer, 2006). As one of the core 
characteristics of trustworthy people, ability captures “the knowledge and skills needed to 
do a specific job along with the interpersonal skills and general wisdom needed to succeed 
in an organization” (Colquitt, Scott, & LePine, 2007: p. 910). The perceived ability of 
coworkers may add up to benevolence and integrity to improve the level of trustworthiness 
upon members. Trustworthiness increases positive expectations on trustee and people tend 
to feel positive emotions, such as happiness and relaxation, when coworkers are 
trustworthy. This situation is more likely considering the cooperative culture in Asian 
companies.  
In organizations where most jobs are executed as a team, if an employee believes that 
coworkers can generate creative ideas, he/she will have higher expectancy that her/his own 
efforts will be related to creative performance (Vroom, 1964). Employees will be 
motivated to engage in creative performance and be enthusiastic and excited when they 
expect legitimate return for their effort. This relationship is supported by the positive 
relationship between collective efficacy belief and team positive affect (Hong & Lee, 2013; 
Riggs & Knight, 1994), which shows positive emotional reactions to team members’ 
ability to successfully perform tasks. In addition, working with coworkers who are full of 
new ideas and creative solutions is generally more fun; thus, positive emotion is expected. 
The perception that coworkers have better creative ability implies that the focal person 
observed and experienced sharing of such creative ideas. In such cases, he/she perceives 
he has coworkers who can be a great asset to her/himself and make positive affective 
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reactions. 
2. Expanded the application of social comparison theory to creativity literature 
Second, this study contributed to the social comparison literature by expanding the 
application of social comparison theory to creativity literature. By depicting the distinct 
effect of upward social comparison on emotion, cognition, and creativity in organizational 
team situations, this study asserted the importance of understanding social comparison 
dynamics in organizational teams. The possible effect of social comparison on creativity 
has been investigated in various studies in several literatures, including studies relating 
social comparison and brainstorming productivity (Dugosh & Paulus, 2005; Michinov & 
Primois, 2005) and those on the effects of implied social comparison (e.g., competition) 
on individual creativity (Conti et al., 2001). Existing studies have demonstrated plausible 
social comparison effect on creativity, but the application of social comparison theory on 
creativity in organizational behavior literature has been limited (Greenberg et al., 2007). 
As work teams have become the most essential source of creativity in organizations, the 
effects of team dynamics on creativity can be understood by social comparison theory. This 
study provided theoretical ground to investigate creativity from the lens of social 
comparison theory through the establishment of a new framework.  
Implications to Emotion–Cognition Literature  
This study also contributed to emotion–cognition literature. In line with recent 
developments in emotional research across various disciplines, I adopted the circumplex 
model of emotions to investigate the affective reactions to social comparison. At present, 
most studies on creativity empirically viewed individual emotions through the lens of 
positive/negative affectivity or discrete emotions (Baas et al., 2008). However, recent 
studies from diverse disciplines highlighted the empirical and heuristic limitations of the 
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discrete emotion model and argued that researchers must shift to the dimensional approach 
(A. J. Gerber et al., 2008). Answering the calls to shift to dimensional approach, which is 
found to better explain individual emotions (Eerola & Vuoskoski, 2011; Gu et al., 2018), I 
adopted a 2D model of emotions with valence and activation as its two axes and 
empirically validated the model as a mediating mechanism connecting social comparison 
and creativity.  
Another core contribution of this study is that it verified the differential effect of 
emotional valence in the organizational team setting. This study was theoretically built 
upon dual pathway model (De Dreu et al., 2008) and empirically validated with field data. 
Dual pathway model explained individual creativity with emotion and cognition, asserting 
that once activated, positive valence leads to cognitive flexibility, negative valence leads 
to cognitive persistence, and both cognitive processes are related to creativity (De Dreu et 
al., 2008). The results confirm the importance of activation level by showing that 
deactivated individuals are cognitively demotivated to show reduced creativity. With a 
multi-wave multi-source data collected from diverse organizational teams, this study 
discovers that once activated, positive emotion engenders cognitive flexibility and 
persistence, whereas negative emotion exhibits opposite relationships. These findings 
agree with the established literature, which suggests that positive emotion is related to 
creativity because it promotes loose and heuristic information processing (Forgas, 1995), 
whereas negative emotion reduces attentional focus and makes people stick to established 
strategies (Baumann & Kuhl, 2002; Vosburg, 1998). According to dual pathway model and 
a school of studies, negative emotion may lead to creativity because it enables people to 
persevere in their cognitive efforts in systematic thinking (De Dreu et al., 2008; Rietzschel 
et al., 2007). The current study showed that only positive emotion is related to cognitively 
108 
motivated state of employees (i.e., cognitive flexibility and cognitive persistence). The 
findings of the current research challenge the dual pathway model in organizational team 
settings. I speculated that dual pathway model could be modified for team settings for 
several reasons. First, unlike experimental tasks or individually performed tasks, 
employees working in organizational teams on creative tasks tend to be in an 
interdependent relationship (Cooke et al., 2003). Therefore, a team worker needs a tacit 
consent and collaborative climate from coworkers to spend a long time on a certain 
problem until it is solved because his/her work is related to that of other team members 
(Fleming & Monda-Amaya, 2001). Therefore, unlike individuals who may react to 
negative emotion with exertion of more effort, a team employee may become cognitively 
persistent only when she/he feels positive affects. Second, when an employee feels 
negative emotion while working with team members, the person tends to take it as a signal 
that something is wrong in the working team (Ambady & Gray, 2002; Fiedler, 1988). This 
negative signal induces the focal person to become risk averse and stick to existing strategy 
and simple tasks rather than challenge and endeavor efforts to difficult problems because 
his/her work is correlated with that of team members (Baumann & Kuhl, 2002). Overall, 
these findings reveal the different emotion–cognitive reactions in organizational teams.   
Finally, this study expanded the research scope of emotion–cognition theories and 
contributes empirically by providing a process model connecting social comparison and 
creativity. The results exhibit the dominant role of cognitive flexibility in relation to 
creativity. The findings show that cognitive flexibility increases radical and incremental 
creativity and significantly decreases creative disengagement, whereas cognitive 
persistence has no significant effect on three types of creative outcomes. The results 
suggest that flexible cognitive attitude is required to gain unique and useful ideas (Lin, 
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Tsai, Lin, & Chen, 2014). 
Practical Implications 
This study offered several valuable practical implications that are relevant to 
organizational managers who want to encourage employee creativity within their team 
systems. The creativity of employees working in team systems is influenced by social 
interactions among team members. Consistent positive reactions to upward social 
comparison suggest that employees prefer being a member of a strong team to being a 
strong individual in a group of weak members. Perception of one’s membership in a team 
of high potency increases activated positive affect, which leads to cognitive flexibility. 
Thus, leaders should play an active role in directly and indirectly encouraging employees 
to believe that they belong to a strong team and have pride in their team membership. 
Leaders and members should pay attention to fostering mutual respect and honor between 
team members to promote positive perceptions toward their team. Managers may consider 
formulating teams with members with high creative ability such that capable employees 
interact to make creative outcomes.   
Managers should be aware that negative emotion is related to lower level of cognitive 
motivation, which leads to disengagement in creativity. Unlike people assigned with 
individual tasks who abandon substantial cognitive efforts when feeling negative emotions, 
people working in teams perceive negative emotion as a negative sign where s/he should 
reduce risk-taking behaviors. Efforts to reduce negative emotion among team members 
regardless of activation level will improve individual creativity in work teams. 
Top management and managers of organizations that require creativity must attempt 
to improve the cognitive flexibility of their employees. In these organizations, employees 
with high cognitive flexibility may deliver set-breaking ideas that are needed for 
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organizational success. Managers must maintain activated positive emotional states and 
reduce activated negative emotion of their employees to improve the flexible thinking of 
employees. Management may also consider providing a working environment that enables 
association of remote ideas from different departments or teams, for example by creating 
a mingling area or communication activities.  
Limitations and Future Research Directions 
This study revealed several intriguing questions that merit further investigation. The 
results of the current study show team members’ consistent positive reactions to upward 
social comparison. The participants of this study are relatively young (33 years old) and 
have lower-level function (41.5% are staff), and these characteristics may have influenced 
positive affective reactions to upward social comparison. For example, a new staff who is 
not familiar with the job and a manager who should be skilled at work may have different 
emotional reactions when team members show superb performance. Future studies may 
consider the possible effect of relative rank of a focal person (i.e., rank of the focal 
participant versus average rank of team members) on upward social comparison. Moreover, 
the consistent positive reactions toward upward social comparison may turn out differently 
in organizations where team members are in pooled interdependence, where each member 
performs his/her task independently (Baruah & Paulus 2009). In such cases, individuals 
may consider comparison with others as counterparts of competition rather than coworkers 
in a cooperative relationship. Empirically investigating and comparing the contingency 
effects of different levels of task interdependence and the effects of individual-based/team-
based reward will be a meaningful stretch of the current research. 
The current study revealed that social comparison perception influences affective, 
motivational, and cognitive reactions in organizational team setting. Despite the plausible 
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applicability of social comparison theory in diverse individual attitude and behaviors in 
organizational teams, few attempts have been made to apply this theory to understanding 
the effects of social relationships on organizational behaviors. Thus, the social comparison 
literature may benefit from examining the possible effects of social comparison 
perceptions on other team-related outcomes in organizations. 
The current study adopted direct measurement of upward social comparison by asking 
participants to compare their creative ability with coworkers’. This approach is legitimate 
considering that perceived measurement is the most proximal determinant of actual 
attitudes and behavior of individuals (Cable & DeRue, 2002; Kristof-Brown, Zimmerman, 
& Johnson, 2005). However, social comparison literature may benefit from investigating 
the indirect measurements of social comparison, such as comparing one’s creative ability 
that is measured by the focal participant and coworkers, which may be relatively free from 
social desirability. Social comparison measurements provided from external sources, such 
as leader feedback or personnel evaluation scores may be used to further reduce the effects 
of social desirability or emotions and investigate the effects of “upward social comparison 
state;” it may also enrich our understanding of social comparison reactions.  
This study revealed distinctive characteristics of work teams in the process leading to 
creativity. Unlike dual pathway model, which poses cognitive flexibility and persistence 
from positive and negative activated emotions as two predictors of creativity, the results 
from this dissertation exhibits that activated positive emotion is important for employee 
creativity in organizational teams. In classic studies, it was argued that negative emotion 
has positive effects on individual performance, as first suggested by Alloy and Abramson’s 
prominent experiment of “sadder but wiser” students in 1979. However, the result of this 
research agrees with the notion of “happier and smarter” (Chuang, 2007; Staw & Barsade, 
112 
1993) and the positive role of activated and positive affects on work motivation in Seo et 
al.’s model (Seo & Barrett, 2007; Seo, Bartunek, & Barrett, 2010). Future studies may 
reinvestigate dual pathway model and further enlighten the role of activated positive 
emotions in relation to creativity. 
Despite increasing interest on the social aspect of creativity, the consideration of 
social aspect within creativity is lacking. Creativity studied in previous studies was 
concerned with making new and useful ideas within a single person. Only “team creativity” 
as a measurement of creative outcomes of a single team (Sung & Choi, 2012) was 
considered even in team contexts. In organizational teams, where continuous interactions 
between members are important, the type of people who can generate creativity by 
facilitating others plays a great role. Future researchers should differentiate types of people 
who contribute to team creativity by making creative ideas alone or those who generate 
creative ideas by facilitating others.  
 
CONCLUSION 
This study is an important step to introduce social comparison influence to examine 
individual creativity. In the examination of its relationship with diverse types of creativity 
through emotion and cognition, the results reveal interesting reactions to upward social 
comparison, reflecting the unique characteristics of organizational team settings. In 
organizational teams where members share a long-term history of working together, 
upward social comparison with coworkers results in positive emotions. The largely 
positive reactions to upward comparison are strengthened when employees perceive high 
attainability but weakened when creative requirement is high. Positive reactions to upward 
social comparison are positively related to radical and incremental creativity through 
113 
cognitive flexibility. In contrast, activated negative affect is negatively related to radical 
and incremental creativity through cognitive flexibility and persistence. These results 
emphasize the importance of maintaining activated positive affect and prohibiting 
activated negative affect in organizations with team structure. Cognitive demotivation is 
detrimental to creativity, confirming the importance of cognitive motivation for creativity. 
The results of the current study imply that in work teams in contemporary organizations 
that are full of uncertainty and high risks, employees need safety and relief to be able to 
boldly engage in creative behaviors. Perhaps, we should now move away from “sadder but 
wiser” employees (Alloy & Abramson, 1979) and keep our team members “happier and 
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팀원들과의 비교 (Upward Social Comparison)  
 (전반적 업무수행능력이 아닌) 우리팀 팀원들의 평균적인 창의성 수준을 나와 비
교해볼 때…  
1. 우리 팀원들은 직관적 사고력이 뛰어난 편이다. 
2. 우리 팀원들은 상상력이 풍부하다. 
3. 우리 팀원들은 새로운 아이디어를 잘 생각해낸다. 
4. 우리 팀원들은 주어진 문제에 대해 창의적 해결책을 잘 제시한다. 
5. 우리 팀원들은 전반적인 창의성이 뛰어나다. 
6. 우리 팀원들은 높은 창의적 성과를 나타낸다. 
 
창의성에 대한 업무상 요구 (Creative Requirement) 
1. 내 업무는 나에게 창의성을 요구한다. 
2. 내 업무는 주어진 문제에 창의적 아이디어를 제시할 것을 요구한다. 
3. 내 업무는 새로운 아이디어를 생각해낼 것을 요구한다. 
4. 내 업무는 주어진 현상이나 문제에 대해 다양한 관점을 필요로 한다. 
 
창의성의 개인적 중요성 (Relevance for Creativity) 
1. 창의성을 발휘하는 것은 나에게 중요하다. 
2. 창의성 발현은 나의 핵심가치 중 하나이다. 
3. 내가 창의성을 발휘하는 것은 이 회사에서 나의 미래에 영향을 미친다. 
 
창의성에 대한 지원 (Support for Creativity) 
1. 우리 팀은 새로운 아이디어를 생각해낼 수 있도록 충분한 자원을 제공한다. 
2. 우리 팀에서 나는 새로운 해결책을 생각해 내는데 필요한 물질적 지원을 쉽게 
얻을 수 있다.  
3. 우리 팀은 내가 새로운 아이디어를 생각해내기에 충분한 시간적 여유를 제공한
다. 
4. 우리 팀에서 나는 새로운 해결방법을 개발하는데 필요한 금전적 지원을 받을 수 
있다. 
 
창의적 잠재력 (Perceived Attainability) 
1. 나의 창의성은 상황에 따라 더 발현될 수 있다. 
2. 나는 노력하기만 하면 창의성을 발전시킬 수 있다. 
3. 나의 창의적 능력은 팀 업무환경에 따라 발전될 수 있다.  
4. 나는 필요하다면 지금보다 더 큰 창의성을 발휘할 수 있다. 
 
창의적 업무상황에서 느끼는 감정 (Affective Reactions)  
지난 몇주간, 귀하가 팀에서 동료들과 업무상 문제를 해결하고 아이디어를 끌어내
면서 어떤 감정을 느꼈는지를 표시하여 주십시오 
나는 팀 내에서 동료들과 창의적 업무를 할 때… 
(Activated Positive Affect) 
- 열정적이다. 
- 영감을 얻는다. 
- 신나고 흥분된다. 
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(Deactivated Positive Affect) 
- 편안하다. 
- 느긋하다. 
- 걱정이 없다  
- 차분하다. 
 
(Deactivated Negative Affect) 
- 우울하다. 
- 낙담을 한다. 
- 희망이 없다.  
 





유연한 업무처리 (Cognitive Flexibility)  
1. 이 팀에서 나는 직면한 문제를 창의적으로 해결할 방안을 강구한다. 
2. 이 팀에서 나는 문제해결을 위한 다양한 대안들을 검토하고 고려한다.  
3. 이 팀에서 나는 주어진 업무 상황에 다양한 방법을 시도해본다. 
4. 이 팀에서 일할 때 나는 다양한 방식으로 일을 추진한다. 
 
지속적 업무노력 (Cognitive Persistence)  
1. 이 팀에서 일할 때, 나는 시간이 오래 걸리더라도 문제의 해결책을 찾아내려고 
노력한다. 
2. 나는 아무리 어려운 일이라도 포기하지 않고 지속적으로 노력한다. 
3. 나는 업무 상에서 도전적인 일이라도 잘 될 때까지 지속적으로 고민한다. 
4. 나는 성공에 대한 불확실성이 있더라도 주어진 업무를 끝까지 시도해본다. 
 
업무 선호도 (Cognitive Demotivation) 
1. 이 팀에서 일할 때, 나는 가급적 단순한 일을 선호한다 
2. 나는 이 팀에서 업무와 관련하여 쉽게 해결할 수 있는 일을 선호한다. 
3. 이 팀에서 일할 때, 나는 깊은 고민없이 수행할 수 있는 업무에 집중한다. 
4. 이 팀에서 일할 때, 나는 업무적으로 새로운 방식을 시도해야하는 상황은 가급
적 피한다. 
 
사회비교성향 (Social Comparison Orientation) 
1. 나는 나의 성취와 다른 사람의 성취를 종종 비교하는 편이다. 
2. 나는 내가 일하는 방식과 다른 사람들이 일하는 방식을 항상 비교한다. 
3. 나는 회사에서 다른 사람들과 나의 현재 상태나 수준을 비교한다. 
4. 나는 모든 측면에서 다른 사람들과 나를 항상 비교하는 편이다. 
5. 내가 얼마나 잘했는지 알려면 내가 한 일과 다른 사람들이 한 일을 비교해야 한
다. 





다음 항목은 직원들의 창의적 성향에 대하여 파악하기 위한 것입니다. 각 팀원의 
전반적 업무능력이 아닌 “창의성 측면에만 국한하여” 응답하여 주십시오. 
 
급진적 창의성 (Radical Creativity) 
1. 이 직원은 남들이 생각 못하는 창의적인 아이디어를 생각해낸다. 
2. 이 직원은 일을 할 때 상당한 정도의 독창성을 보인다. 
3. 이 직원은 일을 하는데 있어 완전히 새로운 방식을 제시한다. 
 
개량적 창의성 (Incremental Creativity) 
1. 이 직원은 기존 아이디어나 업무방식을 적절하게 새로운 방식으로 활용한다. 
2. 이 직원은 기존에 존재하는 아이디어를 응용하고 개량하는 데 뛰어나다.  
3. 이 직원은 기존 업무방식을 자신의 현재 필요에 맞게 개선하여 사용한다. 
 
비관여적 창의성 (Creative Disengagement)  
1. 이 직원은 문제해결시 전통적 방식을 고수하는 편이다. 
2. 이 직원은 새로운 아이디어 자체에 큰 관심이 없다. 
3. 이 직원은 자신의 창의성에 대한 남들의 평가를 크게 신경쓰지 않는다. 
4. 이 직원은 창의성을 발휘하는 데에 별다른 관심을 보이지 않는다. 
 







사회비교이론 관점에서 살펴본 개인창의성:  
팀내 상향비교에 대한 감정적 인지적 과정의 매개효과 및  
직무창의성요구와 창의적자원의 조절효과 
 
서울대학교 대학원 
경영학과 경영학 전공 
양 유 하 
 
사회발전의 속도가 빨라지고 이에 따라 소비자들의 취향변화도 
급격해지면서 사회 각계각층의 다양한 니즈를 맞추기 위하여 기업 인재들의 
창의성은 기업의 존속과 성공을 위한 필수적 요소가 되었다. 특히 기술의 
고도화와 정보의 홍수속에서 개인보다 팀으로 업무를 처리해야하는 일이 
많아지면서, 이러한 사회적 관계속에서의 창의성에 대한 고려가 주목받고 
있다.  
본 연구는 그 중요성에도 불구하고 창의성 문헌에서 충분히 고려되지 
못했던 사회비교이론(Festinger, 1954)을 창의성의 이중경로모델(De Dreu et al., 
2008)과 결합시켜, 창의적 능력에 대한 팀원들 간의 비교가 직원 개개인의 
창의성에 미치는 프로세스를 새로이 밝혔다. 특히, 실제 팀 조직에서 
개인들이 더욱 빈번히 경험하는 상향비교 상황에 초점을 맞추어(Gerber et al., 
2018), 창의적 능력에 대한 팀원들과의 상향비교가 정서적, 인지적 반응을 
통해 창의성에 도달하는 과정을 살펴보았다.  
다양한 문헌에서 정서의 차원적 접근(dimensional approach)의 중요성을 
강조함에 따라, 본 연구에서는 활성화(activation)와 정서가(valence) 두 가지 
차원을 바탕으로 팀내 상향비교에 대한 정서적 반응을 살펴보았다. 또한, 
정서에 이은 인지적 반응을 살펴봄에 있어, 이중경로모델에서 제시한 인지적 
135 
유연성, 인지적 지속성에 인지적 비동기화(cognitive demotivation)상태를 
추가하였고, 이러한 정서적, 인지적 반응이 창의성의 세가지 측면, 즉 급진적 
창의성, 점진적 창의성, 비관여적 창의성으로 연결되는 프로세스를 
분석하였다.  
한달 간격으로 팀원 및 팀장에게 2회에 걸쳐 수집한 데이터를 통해, 본 
연구는 상향비교가 활성화된 긍정적 정서를 통해 인지적 활성화에 영향을 
미치며, 인지적으로 유연한 상태일 때 창의성이 발휘됨을 검증했다. 본 
논문은 기존에 실험연구를 통해 이론적으로 제시되었던 가설들을 발전시켜 
실제 기업에서 최초로 실증 분석함으로써, 현실 기업에서의 팀내 사회적 
관계가 창의성에 미치는 영향을 구체적으로 알아보았다는 점에서 의의를 
가진다. 
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